Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share Agreements by Ring, Diane M. & Oei, Shu-Yi
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
5-2-2015
Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share
Agreements
Diane M. Ring
Boston College Law School, diane.ring@bc.edu
Shu-Yi Oei
Tulane University Law School, soei@tulane.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the Labor and
Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Diane M. Ring and Shu-Yi Oei. "Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share Agreements." Vanderbilt Law Review 68, no.3
(2015): 681-760.
         
 
Human Equity?  
Regulating the New Income  
Share Agreements 
Shu-Yi Oei* 
Diane Ring** 
A controversial new financing phenomenon has recently emerged. New 
“income share agreements” (“ISAs”) enable an individual to raise funds by 
pledging a percentage of her future earnings to investors for a certain number 
of years. These contracts, which have been offered by entities such as Fantex, 
Upstart, Pave, and Lumni, raise important questions for the legal system: Are 
they a form of modern-day indentured servitude or an innovative breakthrough 
in human financing? How should they be treated under the law? 
This Article comprehensively addresses the public policy and legal 
issues raised by ISAs and articulates an analytical approach to evaluating and 
regulating these agreements. While there has been a nascent movement in favor 
of enacting overarching regulatory schemes to govern these new arrangements, 
this Article suggests that we should resist that trend because a unified approach 
is likely to create more problems than it solves. Instead, we suggest the adoption 
of a case-by-case approach that examines each ISA’s distinctive economics and 
draws analogies to more familiar financial arrangements in designing its legal 
treatment. Such case-by-case regulation is likely to generate rules that are more 
equitable and efficient. We offer a multifactor framework for implementing this 
“regulation by analogy.”  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2013, Fantex, Inc. launched a platform that allows 
the public to buy and sell shares that track the brand performance of a 
professional football player.1 The athlete agrees to pay Fantex a 
 1.  See, e.g., Fantex, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B1) (Apr. 25, 2014), available at 
https://fantexbrands.com/files/Final%20Fantex%20Vernon%20Davis%20Prospectus_v001_f1o896
.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XP8V-R8KF (describing Fantex’s issuance of stock tracking the 
Vernon Davis brand). 
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percentage of his future earnings attributable to NFL and related 
activities in exchange for a lump-sum payment up front. Shareholders 
earn dividends based on payments received by Fantex from the athlete. 
Although the Fantex stock offering is actually of shares in Fantex, Inc., 
the popular press has not hesitated to characterize the offering as an 
opportunity to buy shares or to invest in a football player.2 
The Fantex transaction is not unique. Rather, it is just one 
example of a new type of financing arrangement that has recently 
emerged: income share agreements (“ISAs”). These agreements, which 
have arisen in contexts as diverse as professional sports, education, and 
startup financing, possess a critical feature in common: an individual 
seeking immediate financing obtains funds by pledging a percentage of 
her future income to investors for a certain number of years. ISAs 
represent a notable departure from traditional forms of individual 
lending (e.g., student loans or venture debt) because they effectively 
grant the funding provider the upside if earnings are higher than 
expected and the downside risk if they are lower. As such, they raise a 
number of important challenges for the legal system, including 
questions of whether they should be permitted and, if so, how they 
should be regulated. In this Article, we take up the important 
normative and legal questions raised by these new arrangements and 
propose a framework for designing their regulation.3 This Article 
constitutes the first serious attempt in the legal literature to 
comprehensively address the legal and regulatory issues raised by ISAs 
and to articulate a generalized analytical approach to their regulation.4 
ISAs have developed against the backdrop of Internet platforms 
that reach millions, a continued credit crunch in borrowing, and several 
decades of creative financial contracts. Over the past two years,5 a 
 2.  See, e.g., Patrick Clarke, Fantex Holdings Will Allow Fans to Buy, Sell Stock in Arian 
Foster, Pro Athletes, BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 17, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/ 
1814830-fantex-holdings-will-allow-fans-to-buy-sell-stock-in-arian-foster-pro-athletes, archived 
at http://perma.cc/XQU3-X9LV (suggesting, in its headline, that the stock is an investment in 
Arian Foster himself).   
 3.  This Article develops more fully the concepts introduced in our prior essay. See Shu-Yi 
Oei & Diane M. Ring, The New “Human Equity” Transactions, 5 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 266 (2014). 
 4.  The few other scholarly treatments have focused on more discrete issues, such as the 
treatment of ISAs under securities and tax law. See Oei & Ring, supra note 3; Jeff Schwartz, The 
Corporatization of Personhood, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466720. 
 5.  See, e.g., Kate Rogers, Is the Private Sector Going to Fix the Student Debt Problem?, 
FOXBUSINESS (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/04/25/is-
private-sector-going-to-fix-student-debt-problem/, archived at http://perma.cc/VG67-WNAN.  
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growing number of for-profit companies,6 nonprofits,7 and government 
entities8 have begun offering variations of these arrangements. 
Although ISAs have precursors in older arrangements, such as Bowie 
Bonds9 or Milton Friedman’s human capital contracts,10 the current 
social and financial environment, paired with the availability of 
Internet technology, magnifies their potential impact and proliferation. 
Even as their availability increases, however, ISAs pose serious 
yet unanswered questions for the legal system: Should they be freely 
permitted? Do they cross the line into ownership or equity-like interests 
in humans—a de facto “incorporation” of humans?11 Do these 
arrangements involve excessive relinquishments of personal freedom 
and autonomy? Do they raise Thirteenth Amendment problems? If 
some or all of these transactions should be encouraged or at least 
permitted, how should they be regulated under securities, bankruptcy, 
contract, tax, and consumer protection law? Which agencies or legal 
actors should be responsible for their regulation? Because the new 
generation of ISAs has only recently emerged, the legal literature has 
barely begun to grapple with these questions.12 
 6.  See, e.g., PAVE, http://www.pave.com, archived at https://perma.cc/5YQK-B7HE (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 7.  See, e.g., About Lumni, LUMNI, INC., http://www.lumni.net/about/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/G7XM-6KV3 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) (offering both nonprofit and for-profit fund 
models); 13TH AVENUE FUNDING, http://13thavenuefunding.org, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
4QBY-MKC3, (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).  
 8.  See H.B. 3472, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013) (directing consideration of a pilot 
“Pay Forward, Pay Back” program whereby students could opt to pay a proportion of their future 
income in lieu of present payment of tuition and fees); see also Martha C. White, Oregon’s ‘Pay It 
Forward’ Program: Imagine College with No Tuition, No Loans, No Debt (Jul. 17, 
2013), TIME.COM, http://business.time.com/2013/07/17/oregons-pay-it-forward-program-imagine-
college-with-no-tuition-no-loans-no-debt/, archived at http://perma.cc/5CKB-UVPF (describing 
Oregon’s income-based repayment plan specifically and various state income-based repayment 
plans generally). 
 9.  See, e.g., Bowie’s Latest Hit: Royalty-Tied Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at 
B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/21/nyregion/bowie-s-latest-hit-royalty-tied-
bonds.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WY3V-Z53N (describing bonds paying interest from the 
royalties on certain David Bowie songs). 
 10.  MILTON FRIEDMAN & SIMON KUZNETS, Income in the Professions and in Other Pursuits, 
in INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 90 n.20 (1945): 
An individual will rarely sell a fixed proportion of his future income to an investor (i.e., 
he will rarely sell “stock” in himself), though he may borrow money . . . . On the other 
hand, if individuals sold “stock” in themselves, i.e., obligated themselves to pay a fixed 
proportion of future earnings, investors could “diversify” their holdings and balance 
capital appreciations against capital losses . . . . Such investments would be similar to 
others involving a large element of risk, a type of investment usually financed by stocks 
rather than bonds. 
 11.  For a science-fiction examination of a world in which humans are incorporated at birth, 
see DANI KOLLIN & EYTAN KOLLIN, THE UNINCORPORATED MAN (2009).  
 12.  For initial explorations of ISAs, see Oei & Ring, supra note 3; Schwartz, supra note 4.  
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The distinctiveness of ISAs paired with a desire for regulatory 
certainty has led to a nascent movement in favor of enacting 
overarching legal and regulatory schemes to govern them. For example, 
in April 2014, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and former Representative 
Tom Petri (R-WI) introduced a bill, the “Investing in Student Success 
Act,” seeking to clarify the legality of ISAs and their treatment under 
securities, tax, bankruptcy, and usury laws.13 Other commentators 
have also suggested a unified and consistent regulatory framework.14 
This Article cautions against such an approach. It argues that a 
unified regulatory scheme may create as many problems as it solves. 
Despite their shared features, ISAs are heterogeneous and can 
resemble a variety of financial arrangements with which we are already 
familiar. New variations could also develop. Given their diversity, their 
resemblance to various preexisting categories, and the fact that we 
already have regulatory structures for such preexisting categories, the 
adoption of a new and unified regulatory scheme may cause 
economically similar transactions to be treated differently and 
ultimately may be over- or underinclusive or distortionary. 
This Article argues instead that there are good reasons for 
making normative judgments and regulatory decisions about ISAs on a 
case-by-case basis by comparing and analogizing each new transaction 
to a more familiar arrangement (such as debt, corporate equity, 
servitude, insurance, or partnership interests) and by regulating it 
similarly to its closest analogue.15 Each regulatory field should conduct 
this type of analysis in designing the treatment of ISAs. The process of 
comparison and analogy allows our experience with regulating similar 
transactions to guide our normative review of the new ISAs. In cases 
where a new transaction resembles, in substance, one for which there 
exists a clear set of rules, invention of a separate regulatory approach 
is likely to create unnecessary legal distinctions and distortions.16 By 
 13.  H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. (2014). Although it died with the close of the 113th Congress, the 
Rubio-Petri Bill is an example of a unified approach and provides a benchmark for likely reform 
proposals. 
 14.  See, e.g., MIGUEL PALACIOS, TONIO DESORRENTO & ANDREW P. KELLY, AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, INVESTING IN VALUE, SHARING RISK: FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION 
THROUGH INCOME SHARE AGREEMENTS (2014) (urging clarification of the legal treatment of ISAs 
in areas such as bankruptcy and tax); Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 6:59) (arguing that 
ISAs should be permitted and regulated under securities law and a complementary disclosure 
regime). 
 15.  This approach is not unprecedented and has been employed in other contexts. See, e.g., 
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (using the 
analogy to physical products liability to build a case for consumer protection with respect to credit 
products).  
 16.  See generally David Weisbach, Line Drawing, Efficiency, and Doctrine in the Tax Law, 
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1631 (1999) (arguing in favor of drawing the most efficient—as opposed 
 
          
2015] HUMAN EQUITY 687 
contrast, “regulation by analogy”—identifying an existing transaction 
with which an ISA has the most similarities and regulating that ISA in 
a comparable fashion—would better avoid such regulatory 
discontinuities. 
Regulation by analogy does have its risks. Some might argue 
that this approach could have a chilling effect on the ISA market due to 
outcome uncertainty in the treatment of any given transaction. 
However, this critique conflates regulatory certainty with substantive 
uniformity. While a comprehensive and uniform regime for ISAs might 
provide greater certainty for the covered transactions,17 it would likely 
create significant and unnecessary legal distinctions and distortions as 
between ISAs and other economically similar transactions. On the flip 
side, it is possible to provide some regulatory certainty while doing 
regulation by analogy. This could be achieved, for example, by using 
narrowly tailored prototype guidance released by the relevant 
regulatory authorities, either in the form of regulations or rulings. Use 
of such carefully crafted safe harbors is a practice already familiar in a 
variety of regulatory fields.18 
This Article suggests that regulation by analogy is best 
accomplished using a multifactor analysis to probe each transaction’s 
true economics. Our multifactor approach draws upon jurisprudence 
developed in tax and bankruptcy law, where courts have examined a 
to the most doctrinally significant—lines between transactions in the tax law context); Jeff Strnad, 
Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569, 570–71 (1994) 
(suggesting two analogical methods for assigning tax treatment to new financial arrangements); 
see also Bradley T. Borden, Quantitative Model for Measuring Line-Drawing Inequity, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 971 (2013) (modeling inequity caused by line drawing); Yehonatan Givati, Walking a Fine 
Line: A Theory of Line Drawing in Tax Law, VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2555254 (examining how lines are drawn in tax law). 
 17.    See infra Part III.A (discussing the view that a single regime applied to a broad swath 
of ISAs would provide regulatory certainty, across many fields, to covered participants and 
proposing a case-by-case approach instead). 
 18.   For example, Regulation D, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
provides a safe harbor from the onerous registration requirements for the issuance of certain 
securities. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–08 (2014). Another example, from the federal tax law, was the 
provision of a safe harbor for certain leasing transactions. See MARGARET RILEY, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., SAFE HARBOR LEASING, 1981 AND 1982 (1983), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-soi/81-82sahale.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S2LB-SX32:  
[T]he new [1981] provisions guaranteed that a transaction would be recognized as a 
lease for Federal income tax purposes, regardless of existing IRS guidelines for 
determining whether a transaction is a lease, or merely a financing arrangement not 
subject to the same tax benefits, and also regardless of whether its nontax economic 
substance would otherwise be recognized as a true lease. 
State-level regulators also employ safe harbor provisions. For example, Massachusetts regulations 
provide a safe harbor for manufacturers attempting to comply with state law handgun 
childproofing design requirements by listing several alternatives, which are deemed to meet the 
functional standard of the law. See 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 16.05 (LexisNexis 2014). 
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number of relevant factors to distinguish lenders from firm owners in 
determining their appropriate treatment.19 However, we envision that 
the application of the multifactor approach would differ depending on 
the legal regime doing the analysis, both in terms of the specific factors 
applied and the emphasis accorded to each factor. A multifactor 
approach allows us to examine the true economics of existing and future 
ISAs on a case-by-case basis, rather than arriving at universal 
conclusions regarding all ISAs. Although a broader, more unified 
regulatory framework for ISAs may become advisable down the road, 
uncertainties surrounding ISAs and their development suggest that the 
initial regulatory move should be one grounded in analogy. 
Part II of this Article describes ISAs, discusses their historical 
antecedents, and explains how they relate to parallel developments in 
crowdfunding. Part III first explains why a case-by-case analysis that 
analogizes the ISAs to existing transactions is the superior approach 
for their evaluation and regulatory design. It then generally describes 
the universe of existing transactions to which ISAs are most analogous, 
focusing first on the analytical extremes of slavery or servitude, and 
debt, and then exploring the intermediate analytical possibilities. Part 
IV sets forth our multifactor framework for determining whether a 
given ISA is most analogous to debt, human ownership, or something 
else, and correspondingly how it should be regulated. Part V 
demonstrates the operation of our multifactor framework by applying 
it to Pave, a pioneer in ISA offerings. This Part then examines the 
Rubio-Petri proposed legislation as an illustration of the risks of an 
overarching regulatory approach. 
The proposal for case-by-case analysis advocated herein is a 
second best solution, in the sense that it accepts as given the backdrop 
of existing regulations governing financial instruments, with all of their 
inconsistencies and imperfections. However, our proposed approach is 
ultimately sound; drafting a single, comprehensive regulatory regime 
for ISAs while deferring to existing regulatory regimes for other types 
of transactions would likely create unintended and inappropriate 
disjunctures and inefficiencies between the treatment of ISAs and other 
transactions. Our proposed approach avoids that pitfall. 
 
 
 
 
 19.  See, e.g., Indmar Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 444 F.3d 771, 784 (6th Cir. 2006); Fin Hay Realty 
Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968). 
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II. THE TRANSACTIONS: CURRENT VARIANTS AND  
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
The transactions discussed in this Article are not homogenous. 
Rather, their structures and economics vary, and they have arisen 
across a number of sectors. Part II.A provides an overview of the new 
ISAs.20 Part II.B briefly describes their evolution and development. 
Part II.C discusses how ISAs relate to recent developments in 
crowdfunding and its regulation. 
A. The New Income Share Agreements 
1. Fantex, Inc. 
As noted, Fantex is a trading platform that allows the public to 
acquire stock linked to the brand performance of professional football 
players.21 As of April 2015, Fantex has commenced or announced stock 
offerings relating to the brand performance of Vernon Davis, a San 
Francisco 49ers tight end; E.J. Manuel, a Buffalo Bills quarterback; 
Mohamed Sanu, a Cincinnati Bengals wide receiver; Michael Brockers, 
a St. Louis Rams defensive tackle; and Alshon Jeffery, a Chicago Bears 
wide receiver.22 It plans to undertake additional stock offerings in the 
future. 
Underlying each offering is a contract between Fantex and the 
athlete, which provides that the athlete receives a lump-sum amount 
up front in exchange for a percentage of his future NFL-related income, 
including income earned from NFL contracts, endorsements, and 
appearance fees.23 For example, in a $4.2 million IPO, Vernon Davis 
received $4 million from Fantex up front in exchange for a ten percent 
stake in his future NFL earnings.24 Although Fantex is actually offering 
stock in Fantex, Inc., in a transaction technically distinct from the 
contract between Fantex and the athlete, the popular press has loosely 
 20.  In addition to the ISAs discussed herein, see ENZI, http://www.enzi.org, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L989-XCLE (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (ISA structure for education funding); 
CUMULUS FUNDING, http://www.cumulusfunding.com, archived at http://perma.cc/CZC2-FEWD 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (an ISA variant providing funds for “virtually any purpose”). 
 21.  See, e.g., Fantex, Inc., supra note 1. 
 22.  Explore Stocks, FANTEX, https://fantex.com/explore, archived at https://perma.cc/3G4D-
K9JU (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). The offering of Michael Brokers shares is pending while the others 
are currently trading. Id. 
 23.  See, e.g., Fantex, Inc., supra note 1 at 1, 97–100. 
 24.  Id. at 6. 
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characterized the deal as an opportunity for stockholders to acquire 
shares in a football player.25 
2. Upstart, Inc.26 
In the entrepreneurial context, Upstart introduced in April 2012 
a transaction that allowed potential investors to invest in individuals 
seeking funds for business or education costs. This model was available 
until May 6, 2014, when it was discontinued in favor of more traditional 
loan products, due in part to regulatory uncertainties.27 However, 
agreements entered into between Upstart and funding recipients prior 
to May 6, 2014, presumably remain in effect. 
In return for an upfront cash investment in the funding 
recipient, investors earned a specified percentage of the funding 
recipient’s earnings for a set term, typically five years.28 The underlying 
documentation was an agreement between Upstart (as a middleman) 
and the funding recipient, under which the recipient agreed to pay the 
investor (indirectly) the agreed percentage of recipient’s total annual 
income as reported on her tax return (Line 22 of Form 1040)29 over the 
specified term. Significantly, Line 22 includes not only wages and 
business income but also interest, dividends, alimony, and lottery 
 25.  See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Steve Eder, Like That Athlete? Buy a Share, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
18, 2013, at A1 (“[N]ow, thanks to Wall Street, fans can buy a stake in their favorite player.”); see 
also Clarke, supra note 2 (suggesting in its headline that the stock is an investment in Arian Foster 
himself as opposed to Fantex’s arrangement with Foster). 
 26.  This description of Upstart’s ISAs draws in part on our prior essay, Oei & Ring, supra 
note 3, at 269–70.  
 27.  Dave Girouard, Sunsetting Income Share Agreements on Upstart, UPSTART BLOG, 
http://blog.upstart.com/post/84980267394/sunsetting-income-share-agreements-on-upstart (May 
7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/953B-SLTT. Upstart noted that “while many regulatory and 
policy efforts are underway to facilitate the development of the market, these efforts will likely 
take many years.” Id. 
 28.  See UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT § 5.a, available at https://www.upstart.com/ 
funding_terms, archived at https://perma.cc/V4HA-J2UE (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). Previously, 
a ten-year term was also available. See OCTOBER 2013 UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT § 5.a (on 
file with authors); see also Alison Griswold, Upstart: Can Crowdfunding Your Education and 
Career Really Work?, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
alisongriswold/2012/08/10/upstart-can-crowdfunding-your-education-and-career-really-work/2/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/E45A-WRJ5 (“Upstart estimates that typical students will raise 
around $30,000 in exchange for 2 to 6% of their 10-year income . . . .”).   
 29.  See UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.a.i. Upstart interposed a grantor 
trust between the investors and the recipient. See Who is Upstart Network Trust?, (Apr. 29, 2014) 
(on file with authors). Upstart entered into the funding agreement with the recipient and then 
transferred that agreement to the Trust (where it became a Trust asset). See id. The Trust issued 
securities to investors in exchange for funds that were used to pay the recipient. Id. The Trust 
securities were secured by the funding agreements and investors only received payment to the 
extent the recipient paid the Trust. Id.; see also How Are the Securities Treated for U.S. Federal 
Income Tax Purposes? (Apr. 29, 2014) (on file with authors).  
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winnings (that is, any income regardless of any connection to the 
activity or venture for which funding was sought).30 
The risk to the investors was partially mitigated by the funding 
agreement’s deferral provision, which deferred the annual payments 
and added a year to the contract term if the recipient’s income for the 
year fell below a preestablished threshold.31 A funding recipient could 
obtain up to five such deferrals, after which she was obligated to pay 
the income share for the remainder of the now-extended contract 
term.32 The “risk” of the recipient’s extraordinary success was capped 
by limiting the total income payment to three times the amount of 
funding received.33 
As of this writing, Upstart has started offering fixed-rate loan 
products.34 Upstart continues to distinguish their loans from more 
traditional loan products on the grounds that their model incorporates 
factors such as educational institution attended, academic area of 
study, academic performance, and employment history in determining 
the applicable interest rate.35 
3. Pave36 
Along with Upstart, Pave is another startup that commenced 
offering ISAs in 2012.37 Pave has never been as open as Upstart in 
making its deal documents public, and the actual deal documents are 
only available to investors and funding seekers upon creation of an 
 30.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0074, FORM 1040: U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME 
TAX RETURN 1 ll. 7–22. 
 31.  UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.b.i. 
 32.  Id. The 2013 Agreement also included a hardship exemption for years in which the 
recipient’s income dropped below $20,000, even if the contract had previously been deferred five 
times for low earnings. No additional contract extension would be made in such circumstances. 
OCTOBER 2013 UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.b.ii. 
 33.  UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.c. In the 2013 Agreement, which 
offered the option of a ten-year contract, the cap was five times the funding amount in the case of 
a ten-year agreement. OCTOBER 2013 UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.c. 
 34.  What is Upstart?, UPSTART, http://upstarthelp.upstart.com/questions/108556-what-is-
upstart, archived at http://perma.cc/7J2F-V5U8 (last visited, Jan. 15, 2015). 
 35.  Id.; see also Am I Eligible to Apply for a Loan?, UPSTART, http:// 
upstarthelp.upstart.com/questions/108498-am-i-eligible-to-apply-for-a-loan, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/Z25M-GZYG (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
 36.  The Pave transaction is governed by an Income-Linked Payment Agreement (“IPA”), 
which is not publicly available. Invest Where It Matters Most to You, PAVE, https:// 
www.pave.com/introduction/backer, archived at http://perma.cc/4MGG-SUDH (last visited Jan. 
15, 2015). See sources cited infra notes 38–48 for information details regarding Pave’s ISA. 
37. See Hadley Malcom, Pave: Alternative to Costly College Loans, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2013, 
http://college.usatoday.com/2013/03/05/pave-alternative-to-costly-college-loans/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/7ZXY-ERMS (noting Pave’s initial ISAs were offered in December 2012). 
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account with Pave.38 Furthermore, as the market for ISAs has 
developed, Pave has made less and less information publicly available 
on its website, so it is difficult to know the exact economics of the 
instruments currently being offered. The following summary is based 
on information that was available on Pave’s website as of May 2014.39 
Pave’s strategy (as of May 2014)40 was to target millennials and 
“high potential individuals” seeking funding for a variety of purposes, 
including to pay off student loans, to finance education, or to pursue 
entrepreneurial ventures.41 Like Upstart, the Pave transaction allows 
funding seekers (“Talent”) to obtain funding by promising to pay 
investors (“Backers”) a fixed percentage (no more than ten percent) of 
their annual Line 22 total income over a specified term, which may not 
exceed ten years.42 However, unlike Upstart, the Pave arrangement is 
“peer-to-peer.”43 The average amount raised is $20,000.44 
If Talent’s income falls below 150 percent of the poverty line, 
repayment obligations are waived, and the payment term is not 
extended.45 If Talent is in school, repayment obligations also cease, but 
 38.  See PAVE, supra note 6. 
 39.  Much of the publicly available information has since been removed from the website, so 
it is difficult to know the extent to which the economics of the Pave structure have changed since 
then. However, as was the case with Upstart, agreements already entered into between Pave’s 
investors and funding seekers presumably remain in effect.   
40.  See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 41.  See How Can the Funds I Raise Be Used?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-
us/articles/200917846-How-can-the-funds-I-raise-be-used- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors); 
Financial Assistance for Millenials, PAVE, http://www.pave.com/financial-assistance-millenials 
(May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). 
 42.  How Much of My Income Will I Share with Backers?, PAVE, 
http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200407638-How-much-of-my-income-will-I-share-with-
Backers- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). If Talent is filing a joint return, the spouse’s income 
is deducted from Line 22 income. What Counts as Income When Calculating How Much I Must 
Share with My Backers?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200407688--What-
counts-as-income-when-calculating-how-much-I-must-share-with-my-Backers- (May 19, 2014) (on 
file with authors).  
 43.  Tell Me More About Pave’s Income-Linked Payment Agreement (IPA), PAVE, 
http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200990453-Tell-me-more-about-Pave-s-Income-linked-
Payment-Agreement-IPA- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). 
 44.  How Much Funding Can I Raise?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/ 
200848547-How-much-funding-can-I-raise- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). Pave collects 
certain fees. What Are Pave’s Fees?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200597893-
What-are-Pave-s-fees- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).   
 45.  Is There Ever a Time During the Participation Period When I Wouldn’t Need to Share 
Income?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200407668-Is-there-ever-a-time-during-
the-participation-period-when-I-wouldn-t-need-to-share-income- (May 19, 2014) (on file with 
authors). In this, Pave is different from Upstart, because Upstart’s hardship exemption does 
extend the payment term. UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28, § 2.b.i. 
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the repayment term is extended.46 Talent can terminate the agreement 
early by paying Backers five times the original funding amount, which 
effectively caps the maximum repayment.47 The payment terms are 
determined for each individual based on Pave’s proprietary funding 
model, which is designed to provide investors with a seven percent rate 
of return.48 While Pave’s transaction resembles Upstart’s, there are 
structural, economic, and “soft” differences between them, which may 
require different approaches to regulation.49  In August 2014, Pave 
announced that it would be piloting a new loan product.50 However, it 
is unclear whether that new product is in addition to, or in replacement 
of, the ISA that Pave had previously been offering. In any event, the 
Pave ISA continues to be relevant as a market leading ISA into which 
Talent and Backers have entered. 
4. Education-Based Transactions 
The income share concept has also permeated the higher 
education context, driven in part by rising education costs and the 
search for alternative financing solutions. As the following discussion 
demonstrates, education-focused ISAs have been offered by for-profit, 
nonprofit, and government entities.51 
a. Lumni 
Lumni manages funds that invest in “diversified pools of 
students.”52 Funding providers invest in a fund, which may be either 
for-profit or nonprofit, and the fund finances the students’ educations.53 
Instead of repaying principal and interest, students repay the fund a 
 46.  Is There Ever a Time During the Participation Period When I Wouldn’t Need to Share 
Income?, supra note 45.  
 47.  Can Talent Exit the Pave IPA Early?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/ 
200478356-Will-I-be-able-to-exit-the-Pave-IPA-early- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors).   
 48.  Our Model, PAVE, http://www.pave.com/funding-model, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
R33Z-SR5N (last visited Feb. 14, 2015); What are the Expected Financial Returns?, PAVE 
http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200678278-What-are-the-expected-financial-returns- 
(May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). 
 49.  See infra Part V. 
50. Introducing the Pave Loan: A Letter from Our Founders (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://blog.pave.com/post/94752393200/introducing-the-pave-loan-a-letter-from-our, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NQ7D-TH5T. Portions of the Pave website continue, as of March 25, 2015, to refer 
to the income-linked payment agreements, Pave’s ISA. See PAVE, https://www.pave.com/ 
introduction/backer, archived at http://perma.cc/GZZ9-5JQH (last visited March 25, 2015). 
Presumably existing ISAs remain active, continuing to run through to term (up to ten years).  
 51.  See also ENZI, supra note 20. 
 52.  About Lumni, supra note 7. 
 53.  Id. 
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fixed percentage of future income for ten years after graduation, and 
the fund distributes a return to the investor.54 Lumni characterizes its 
structure as a “win-win partnership” between students and investors.55 
Lumni launched in Chile in 2002 and since then has expanded 
to Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and the United States.56 Thus, unlike the 
other market participants, Lumni originated overseas and has been in 
operation for a number of years.57 Lumni also works with corporations 
that fund the education of children of employees and distributors, 
though it is unclear whether any of these ventures have launched in the 
United States to date.58 
Lumni is the brainchild of Professor Miguel Palacios.59 Building 
on Milton Friedman’s work,60 Palacios has argued that human capital 
contracts are a superior way of funding higher education because they 
reduce risk for students, improve information and decisionmaking 
regarding the value of education, and increase competition in the higher 
education market.61 Lumni reflects Palacios’s underlying vision. 
b. 13th Avenue Funding 
13th Avenue Funding is a nonprofit that fosters community-
based education funding programs.62 Like Lumni, 13th Avenue’s 
system funds education by requiring students to pay a percentage of 
future income, rather than repay the original loan through a fixed 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.; For Students, LUMNI, http://www.lumni.net/forstudents/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/Q4MK-T7GV (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 56.  LUMNI, supra note 7; Our Story, LUMNI, http://www.lumniusa.net/about/our-story, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XX3L-HL74 (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).  
 57.  Since 2009, Lumni has funded twenty-seven U.S. students. Kate Bachelder, Escaping 
the Student Debt Trap, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-weekend-
interview-escaping-the-student-debt-trap-1402699281. It has funded almost five thousand 
students total since 2002. Id.; see also LUMNI, supra note 7; Our Story, supra note 56.  
 58.  For Corporations, LUMNI, http://www.lumni.net/forcorporations, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5P4M-86PT (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).  
 59.  See MIGUEL PALACIOS LLERAS, INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL (2004); Miguel Palacios, 
Human Capital Contracts: “Equity-like” Instruments for Financing Higher Education, POL’Y 
ANALYSIS NO. 462, Dec. 16, 2002, available at http://lumni.net/about/palacios.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/87HB-5AJV; see also PALACIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra note 14, at 1. 
 60.  See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); see also Friedman & 
Kuznets, supra note 10, at 90 n.20 (noting that “if individuals sold ‘stock’ in themselves, i.e., 
obligated themselves to pay a fixed proportion of future earnings, investors could ‘diversify’ their 
holdings and balance capital appreciations against capital losses”). 
 61. PALACIOS LLERAS, supra note 59, at xviii; PALACIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra note 
14; Palacios supra note 59, at 1. 
 62.  13TH AVENUE FUNDING, supra note 7.  
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monthly amount.63 However, 13th Avenue’s model is distinctive 
because the financing relationship is local: funding providers invest in 
members of the same community.64 Thus, 13th Avenue’s model may 
bear a stronger resemblance to informal funding arrangements among 
friends and family than might be the case with some other ISAs. 
Founded in 2009, 13th Avenue piloted its program at Allan 
Hancock College in Santa Maria, California.65 It hopes that its funding 
model can be extrapolated for use by other local community groups. To 
that end, 13th Avenue has made its deal documents publicly available 
for free use under a creative commons license, together with 
instructions for how to create one’s own “college financing community” 
in other local communities.66 
c. Leff-Hughes Swap Transaction 
In another variation on the ISA concept, Professors Benjamin 
Leff and Heather Hughes have proposed an income-based rate swap 
(“IBR swap”) as a mechanism for financing legal education.67 Under this 
proposal, the student would still borrow from the government or banks 
to finance their legal education.68 But then the student would enter into 
a contract with a financial institution under which that financial 
 63.  See id. Payment is not required if the student is out of work. Id.  
 64.  Id.; see also Rick Cohen, A Venture Capital Model to Pay for College Student Loans, 
NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 6, 2013, 3:18 PM), available at https://nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-
context/22709-a-venture-capital-model-to-pay-for-college-student-loans.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/ZZ7T-935E (“[T]he 13th Avenue concept is meant to help first-generation immigrant 
college students and low-income students.”); Laura Matthews, Student Loan Debt Crisis: A New 
Nonprofit 13th Avenue Wants an America Without College Loans, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013, 
available at http://www.ibtimes.com/student-loan-debt-crisis-new-nonprofit-13th-avenue-wants-
america-without-college-loans-1366729, archived at http://perma.cc/L584-9U5Q (describing 13th 
Avenue’s focus on community building and “pay[ing] it forward”). 
 65.  Our Pilot Program, 13TH AVENUE FUNDING, http://13thavenuefunding.org/styled/ 
index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6F99-FN92 (last visited Feb. 12, 2015); see Matthews, 
supra note 64. 
 66.  How to Build Your Own College Financing Community, 13TH AVENUE FUNDING, 
http://13thavenuefunding.org/styled-2/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UTP8-STM3 (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015). 13th Avenue has made available on its website sample contracts between 
(1) the sponsoring community organization and the student and (2) the sponsoring organization 
and the funding provider. The Documents, 13TH AVENUE FUNDING, http:// 
13thavenuefunding.org/styled-5/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3NKQ-GY9D, (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2015).   
 67.  Benjamin M. Leff & Heather Hughes, The Income-Based Repayment Swap: A New 
Method for Funding Law School Education (Jul. 9, 2013) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291714; see also Jacob Gershman, Placing 
Bets on Law School Graduates, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (July 19, 2013; 3:57 P.M.), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/07/19/placing-bets-on-law-school-graduates/. 
 68.  Leff & Hughes, supra note 67, at 11–19 (describing the IBR swap).  
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institution would assume responsibility for making the student’s law 
school loan repayments.69 In exchange, the student would agree to pay 
the financial institution a percentage of her future earnings over a fixed 
time period.70 The financial institution would make a profit when a 
student ends up in a high-paying job (e.g., Biglaw partner) but would 
experience a loss on students who do not find employment or who enter 
low-paying jobs. Leff and Hughes argue that the IBR swap contains the 
benefits of more traditional ISAs or human capital contracts but can 
help reduce the legal and regulatory barriers associated with ISAs.71 
They do note, however, that the IBR swap may also create adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems and may create inequities in 
student admissions and financial aid decisions.72 
d. Government Income-Contingent Repayment Plans 
The income sharing concept has found its way into the 
government-provided higher education funding sector as well. 
Responding to rising student debt loads, the U.S. government 
introduced in 2009 a federal income-based repayment (“IBR”) program 
for education loans, which permitted qualifying students to cap 
repayments on eligible student loans at fifteen percent of discretionary 
income.73 Payments would be made monthly for twenty-five years, after 
which the loan would be forgiven.74 For qualifying new borrowers on or 
after July 1, 2014, the repayment percentage dropped to ten percent, 
and the repayment term dropped to twenty years.75 The government 
also introduced the Pay As You Earn (or “PAYE”) plan in 2012 for 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 19–50. 
 72.  Id. at 50–58. 
 73.  See Income-Driven Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-
loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn#monthly-payments, archived at http://perma.cc/HB9R-
SWVS (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (summarizing income-driven repayment plans). Discretionary 
income is, generally, adjusted gross income minus 150 percent of the poverty line. Glossary, FED. 
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/glossary#Discretionary_Income, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/RJ8X-PLHP (last visited Jan. 18, 2015); see also College Cost Reduction and Access Act, 
Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 203, 121 Stat. 784, 792–94 (2007) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1098e (2012) 
(income-based repayment)). See generally John R. Brooks II, Income-Based Repayment and the 
Public Financing of Higher Education (Oct. 20, 2014) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2513359 (examining and evaluating IBR’s 
tax-like characteristics).    
 74.  Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73. Under current tax law, this would give rise to 
cancellation of debt income. I.R.C. § 108 (2012). See Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73 (noting 
that “you may be required to pay income tax on any amount that is forgiven . . . .”). But see I.R.C. 
§ 108(f) (exception for student loans where individual works for certain employers). 
 75.  Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73. 
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qualified new borrowers.76 PAYE caps payments at ten percent and 
forgives the debt after twenty years.77 For students holding public 
service jobs, any remaining debt on Direct Loans under IBR, PAYE, or 
another income-driven repayment plan is cancelled after 120 qualifying 
payments.78 
These plans share two features: the student’s monthly loan 
payment is capped, and students are eligible only if the income-
contingent payment is less than what they would have to pay under the 
standard student loan repayment plan. Thus, unlike the private sector 
models, these income-contingent plans hold no upside for the 
government. It has been pointed out that the government may actually 
be outcompeting the private market for ISAs in providing income-based 
repayment plans with no upside.79 
e. State-Based Alternatives 
Finally, states have also begun exploring creative education 
financing alternatives. In 2013, Oregon passed a bill directing the 
Oregon Higher Education Coordinating Commission (“HECC”) to 
consider the creation of a new pilot program under which students 
attending Oregon state colleges and universities would not pay tuition 
but instead a percentage of their income for a certain time period.80 The 
bill did not establish payment percentages or durations.81 The proposed 
pilot design was created in September 2014.82 In its transmittal letter 
to the Oregon legislature, the HECC noted that this “Pay It Forward” 
pilot was “a worthy initiative for the Oregon Legislature to undertake, 
subject to the availability of funding over and above [the Legislature’s] 
 76.  34 C.F.R. § 685.209 (2014). “New borrowers” are borrowers who did not owe money on a 
federal student loan as of October 1, 2007, and received a Direct Loan disbursement on or after 
Oct. 1, 2011. Id. 
 77.  Id.; Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73.  
 78.  Income-Driven Plans, supra note 73; Public Service Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/public-service, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2ZDS-VD8T (last visited Jan. 17, 2015). 
 79.  See Megan McArdle, When Education Doesn’t Pay, BLOOMBERGVIEW (May 13, 2014, 2:27 
P.M.) http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-13/when-education-doesn-t-pay, archived 
at http://perma.cc/WCH3-989K.  
 80.  See White, supra note 8; see also PAY IT FORWARD WORKGROUP, HOUSE BILL 3472: PAY 
IT FORWARD (2014) available at http://education.oregon.gov/Documents/HECC/Student% 
20Success/8-13-14/PIF%20Report%20Draft%208-7-14d.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VW65-
M7VK (draft report). 
 81.  H.B. 3472, 77th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013). 
 82.  HIGHER EDUC. COORDINATING COMM’N, HOUSE BILL 3472: PAY IT FORWARD, 1–2 (2014), 
available at http://library.state.or.us/repository/2014/201410231424054/. 
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core investment priorities.”83 The HECC recommended that the pilot 
program be undertaken provided that certain funding and other 
conditions are met.84 Other states are looking into comparable 
legislative options, and proposed federal legislation in the 113th 
Congress would have directed feasibility studies and matching grants 
at the federal level (among other recommendations).85 
B. Related Economic Arrangements 
ISAs clearly represent a new wave of human capital 
interactions, but in some respects they resemble arrangements that 
have existed in the past or are operating today.86 At a most basic level, 
families and communities have long invested informally in their youth 
in exchange for reciprocal repayments in the future. Assisted by 
technology platforms, however, such income sharing is now occurring 
on a larger scale and with more formalization. This shift demands a 
more robust legal and normative analysis. Before undertaking that 
analysis, however, it is useful to survey historical antecedents and 
related present-day transactions in order to situate ISAs in context. 
 83.  Letter from Higher Educ. Coordinating Comm’n to Legislator (Sept. 24, 2014) 
available at http://education.oregon.gov/Documents/HECC/Reports%20and%20Presentations/ 
HECCTransmissionLetterPIF.pdf?Mobile=1&Source=%2F_layouts%2Fmobile%2Fdispform%2Ea
spx%3FList%3Dfb51bf5d-4277-431c-8e43-d3c923ec0a13%26View%3D123a0c05-35ed-4887-aef0-
3a43aa5b0fc9%26RootFolder%3D%252FDocuments%252FHECC%252FReports%2520and%2520
Presentations%26ID%3D785%26CurrentPage%3D1, archived at http://perma.cc/F39W-LBPU 
(transmission letter to HECC report). 
 84.  See HIGHER EDUC. COORDINATING COMM’N, supra note 82, at 9. 
 85.  H.R. 3959, 113th Cong. (as introduced in the house Jan. 29, 2014); Thomas L. Harnisch, 
The “Pay It Forward” College Financing Concept: A Pathway to the Privatization of Public Higher 
Education, POL’Y MATTERS, July 2014, at 4, available at http://www.aascu.org/ 
policy/publications/policy-matters/PayItForward.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9682-7MK2 
(describing status of similar legislation in various states); ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTE, 
PAY IT FORWARD: AN UPDATE ON NATIONAL PROGRESS, (2014), http://www.eoionline.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/Update-on-national-progress1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9C8N-D39W 
(reviewing status of legislative efforts underway in other states); see also AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEASIBILITY OF AN ILLINOIS PAY IT FORWARD PROGRAM, AS DIRECTED BY PUBLIC ACT 98-920, 
REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.isac.org/dotAsset/1b1c678e-6a2e-463c-
bfaa-f3265d9c87ec.pdf.  
 86.  Friedman & Kuznets, supra note 10, at 90 n.20; see also Bas Jacobs & Sweder J.G. van 
Wijnbergen, Capital-Market Failure, Adverse Selection, and Equity Financing of Higher 
Education, 63 FINANZARCHIV: PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 5 (2007) (reviewing the challenges of using 
human capital contracts); J.R. Walsh, Capital Concept Applied to Man, 49 Q.J. ECON. 255, 256 
(1935) (examining “whether money spent in acquiring such training is, in a strict sense, a capital 
investment made in a profit-seeking, equalizing market, in response to the same motives which 
lead to the creation of factories, machinery, and the like”). 
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1. Portland’s “IPO Man” 
In a parallel yet idiosyncratic development, at least one 
individual has created “shares” in himself and sold them to investors.87 
Mike Merrill of Portland, Oregon, commenced this share offering in 
2008, and the shares are outstanding to this day.88 Merrill shares can 
be bought and traded on his personal stock exchange and are owned by 
friends, family, and strangers.89 The shares are not backed by a 
company and are a high-risk investment.90 Merrill’s own website states 
that the investment is not safe.91 In fact, the website describes the 
ownership of Merrill shares as “just a metaphor for trust” and as a 
“personal decision-making engine modeled after a stock market” that 
“measure[s] influence as the number of shares a person has.”92 
As a result of this stock offering, Merrill has experienced 
competing shareholder interests, stock price manipulation, and 
investors’ decisions at the expense of his well-being.93 Ever since a 
shareholder complained about not being consulted when Merrill moved 
in with his then-girlfriend94—a decision that could impact his creative 
output and put investor capital at risk—Merrill has allowed 
shareholders to vote on various matters affecting his personal life. To 
date, shareholders have decided (1) whom Merrill should date, (2) that 
he must register as a Republican, (3) that he should become a 
vegetarian, (4) that he should stop sleeping through the night, and 
(5) that he should not get a vasectomy.95 In addition to voting rights, 
each share generates a potential return on profits earned outside of 
Merrill’s day job.96 Merrill’s shareholders have also approved a motion 
 87.  Joshua Davis, Meet the Man Who Sold His Fate to Investors at $1 a Share, WIRED (Mar. 
28, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/ipo-man/, archived at http://perma.cc/HE26-G5MR; Rob 
Walker, How One Man Turned Himself into a Publicly Owned Company, ATLANTIC, April 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/putting-the-i-in-ipo/309255/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FEW6-DPXG.  
 88.  See Davis, supra note 87. 
 89.  See Walker, supra note 87; see also KMIKEYM, www.KmikeyM.com, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XR4T-NEUM (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (exchange for shares in Merrill).  
 90.  See About, KMIKEYM, http://urbanhonking.com/kmikeym/about/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/UE2K-GLVW (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).  
 91.  Id.; see also Nicole Goodkind, Human IPO: Man Sells Himself for $10,000, YAHOO! FIN. 
(Apr. 22, 2013, 8:10 A.M.), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/sell-yourself-10-000-
135455858.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TQ6D-8PVW (share issuance not legally binding). 
 92.  About, supra note 90. 
 93.  See Davis, supra note 87. 
 94.  See Walker, supra note 87. 
 95.  Davis, supra note 87. 
 96.  Id.  
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that, in the event of Merrill’s death, his life insurance proceeds would 
be distributed among themselves.97 
Although the Merrill transaction may seem more like reality 
television than a serious financial investment, it is a useful reminder of 
the range of structuring possibilities in today’s technological 
environment, the power that investors can have over a person’s 
decisions, the potential consequences of applying the share economy to 
an individual, and the uncertainty surrounding the regulation of 
equity-like investments in people. 
2. Baseball Buscones 
ISAs have also been compared to various athlete-agent 
relationships, particularly in professional baseball recruitment but in 
other professional sports contexts as well.98 With respect to professional 
baseball, MLB teams have historically profited by cheaply signing 
Caribbean-born players.99 While Major League Rules require North 
American and Puerto Rican players to enter the First-Year Player 
Draft, international players are exempt.100 Thus, there are few 
restrictions on how they are recruited and signed.101 
The absence of regulation has spawned an industry of local 
street agents known as buscones.102 Buscones promise to develop the 
talent of young boys until they are eligible to sign with an MLB team, 
providing training, food, lodging,103 and representation.104 In exchange, 
the buscone gets a percentage (often between ten and thirty percent) of 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  See Rob Ruck, Baseball’s Recruitment Abuses, AMERICAS Q., Summer 2011, 
http://americasquarterly.org/node/2745, archived at http://perma.cc/RML2-HDHB (describing the 
relationships between athletes and their agents).  
 99.  Kevin Baxter, Dominican Shift, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2008/apr/15/sports/sp-dominicans15, archived at http://perma.cc/J78P-MNM2 (discussing how 
signing bonuses for players from the Dominican Republic were beginning to increase after many 
years of extremely low payments); Ruck, supra note 98 (describing how signing bonuses have 
spiraled to an average of about $131,000 in 2011 compared to an average of $2,000–$5,000 in 1990).  
 100.  Ruck, supra note 98; see 2012–2016 BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS 
AND MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, attachment 46, § I, available at 
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M3LL-L2J4 (explaining the 
potential for addition of an international players draft). 
 101.  Ruck, supra note 98.  
 102.  Most MLB teams today rely on buscones. Baxter, supra note 99. 
 103.  Ruck, supra note 98. 
 104.  Sean Gregory, Baseball Dreams: Striking Out in the Dominican Republic, TIME, July 26, 
2010, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2004099-1,00.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/Y9WC-AN65.  
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the signing bonus if the player signs professionally.105 Though primarily 
active overseas, buscone relationships have occurred domestically as 
well.106 
The growth in the buscone industry has arguably improved 
prospects’ ability to negotiate with MLB teams, driving signing bonuses 
higher.107 But it has also created ethical issues leading the MLB to 
investigate108 exploitation, discontinuation of schooling, provision of 
performance enhancing drugs, age misrepresentation, and overcrowded 
and substandard training facilities.109  
The story of buscones holds a cautionary tale for ISAs. 
Individuals with limited current options but some future potential may 
have no choice but to promise a cut of their future earnings in order to 
improve their chances of securing that successful future. But 
monetization of future human capital may lead to exploitation, given 
power imbalances and information asymmetries. The question, then, is 
how the benefits of ISAs should be weighed against their potential 
risks. 
3. Bowie Bonds 
Parallels may also be drawn between so-called “Bowie Bonds” 
and the new ISAs. In 1997, David Bowie became the first musician to 
securitize his intellectual property rights in a bond offering.110 Bowie 
 105.  Jorge L. Ortiz, Exploitation, Steroids Hitting Home in Dominican Republic, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 26, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2009-03-26-dominican-republic-
cover_N.htm?csp=Forbes, archived at http://perma.cc/6N8A-Y9JP; Ruck, supra note 98. 
 106.  Kyle Finck & Christian Red, ‘Buscones’, or Street Agents, Shape Young Baseball 
Talent . . . for a Price, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/ 
baseball/buscones-street-agents-shape-young-baseball-talent-price-article-1.465231, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X26C-2SYT.  
 107.  In 1990, MLB teams signed three hundred Dominican prospects for an average bonus of 
$2,500. In the first four months of 2011, MLB signed 188 Dominican prospects for an average of 
about $131,000. Ruck, supra note 98. 
 108.  Michael S. Schmidt, Baseball Emissary to Review Troubled Dominican Pipeline, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/sports/baseball/ 
11dominican.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/THY9-TKFJ; Ruck, supra note 98; see 2012–
2016 BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 100, art XII (discipline rules). 
 109.  See Gregory, supra note 104; Ruck, supra note 98; Schmidt, supra note 108. See generally 
Manuel Jimenez, Miami Doping Scandal Casts Pall over Dominican Baseball, REUTERS, (Aug. 8, 
2013) available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/18/us-baseball-doping-dominican-
idUSBRE97H05920130818, archived at http://perma.cc/2MMH-SFEF (observing that up to 
ninety-eight percent of Dominican prospects do not make it to the major leagues). Prospects who 
do not make it to the major leagues return to the Dominican Republic without the education or 
skills necessary to enter the workforce. Gregory, supra note 104. 
 110.  Michael R. McCabe, You Have Now Entered the Bowie Bond Era, SECONDARY MORTGAGE 
MARKET, July 1997, http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/smm/july97/pdfs/mccabe.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y9P2-MNYJ. 
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issued bonds in order to accelerate payment of royalties from his 
music.111 Bowie sold certain catalogue rights, including the rights to 
future royalty payments, to a bankruptcy-remote special purpose 
vehicle (“SPV”).112 Borrowing against future royalty income, the SPV 
raised $55 million.113 The SPV repaid its lender the principal plus 7.9 
percent annual interest for a period of years out of the royalties received 
from the music catalogue.114 Once the negotiated figure was repaid, the 
royalties reverted back to Bowie.115 Because the bond issuance was 
private, there was no SEC registration and no publicly available 
prospectus.116 
Despite the fact that the Bowie transaction was clearly an asset 
securitization structured as debt, it has prompted comparisons to ISAs 
because both are instances of someone transferring rights to future 
earnings in exchange for a current payment. Bowie Bonds involved the 
transfer of intellectual property rights and associated royalties, rather 
than, say, a percentage of future wages. However, the similarities and 
differences between the Bowie transaction and ISAs help pinpoint the 
contexts in which transfers of future earnings may be worrisome. 
4. Yale’s “Tuition Postponement Program” 
Finally, ISAs have antecedents in Yale University’s “Tuition 
Postponement Program,” which included an income-contingent 
payment feature.117 Yale students could enter the program from 1971 
to 1976, after which it was discontinued (although the repayment plan 
continued for existing students into the 2000s).118 Under the terms of 
this voluntary program, participating students agreed to pay 0.4 
percent of their future earnings for every thousand dollars borrowed. 
Payments would be due for thirty-five years or until the debt of their 
 111.  Ian Brodie, Bowie Sells Royalties for 55m to Wall Street, TIMES (London), Feb. 7, 1997, 
at 3; Future Shock? Investors Bet on Rocker’s Royalties, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 1997, at 04D, 
available at 1997 WLNR 3050052; Jay Matthews, Securities Oddity: The Bowie Bond; with Asset-
Backed Debt, the Rock Star Plays Financial Instrument, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1997, at C1, available 
at 1997 WLNR 7363281; Matt Morris, Royalty Securitizations: Were Bowie Bonds Just a Fad?, 
CAPITAL FORMATION INST., http://www.cfi-institute.org/VP%20-%20Royalty%20Securitizations% 
20-%20Morris.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XX6V-MSAJ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 112.  See Morris, supra note 111. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. Bowie’s music catalogue was pledged as collateral in the event of SPV default. Id. 
 115.  See Future Shock?, supra note 111. 
 116. Jennifer Burke Sylva, Bowie Bonds Sold for Far More Than a Song: The Securitization of 
Intellectual Property as a Super-Charged Vehicle for High Technology Financing, 15 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 195, 206 (1999). 
 117.  See PALACIOS LLERAS, supra note 59, at 43–47, 123–25. 
 118.  Id. at 123–24.   
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class had been paid, whichever occurred first.119 Ultimately, several 
factors contributed to dissatisfaction with the program, including its 
duration and the effect of redistribution within the program depending 
on the compliance of other participants.120 
In sum, the present wave of ISAs has antecedents in similar 
transactions that have occurred in the past and also relates to parallel, 
present-day developments in human capital investing. We mention 
some of these transactions and developments in order to situate the new 
ISAs in historical context but also to pinpoint their distinguishing 
features. Unlike previous generations of transactions, the new ISAs are 
more widespread and can be found across the education, 
entrepreneurship, and professional sports sectors. They are easily 
accessed via technological platforms and are being offered both by the 
private sector and by government. Accordingly, the new ISAs impact a 
broader range of participants than previous generations of 
transactions. Thus, closer attention to the regulatory issues they raise 
is warranted. 
C. Relationship to Crowdfunding 
Having described the development of ISAs and their 
antecedents, it is important to discuss how ISAs relate to parallel 
developments in crowdfunding. “Crowdfunding” is not a technical 
financing term but is instead a combination of two existing concepts: 
“crowdsourcing” and “microlending.”121 Crowdsourcing generally means 
obtaining services or ideas from a large group of contributors over the 
Internet,122 and “microlending” refers to the practice of lending small 
amounts of money to poor borrowers.123 The marriage of the two 
produces crowdfunding: small contributions from many people to fund 
entrepreneurial projects.124 
 119.  See William E. Curran, Yale’s Tuition Postponement Option, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 283 (1973). 
 120.  PALACIOS LLERAS, supra note 59, at 126–27; Bret Ladine, ’70s Debt Program Finally 
Ending, YALE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 27, 2001, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2001/03/27/70s-debt-
program-finally-ending/, archived at http://perma.cc/W27W-VVT2.  
 121.  The phrase “crowdfunding” did not appear until 2006. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding 
and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L REV. 1, 11, 27 (citing Kevin Lawton & Dan 
Marom, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION: SOCIAL NETWORKING MEETS VENTURE FINANCING 3 
(2010)). 
 122.  Bradford, supra note 121, at 27 (quoting Tina Rosenberg, Crowdsourcing a Better World, 
N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Mar. 28, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/28/crowdsourcing-a-better-world/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/K8MQ-CYXQ).  
 123.  MUHAMMED YUNUS & ALAN JOLIS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE 
BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY (2008); Bradford, supra note 121, at 28–29. 
 124.  Bradford, supra note 121, at 29. 
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Commentators have identified four types of crowdfunding: 
donative, reward-based, lending-based, and equity-based.125 Donative 
crowdfunding (which is not limited to nonprofits) offers contributors 
nothing in exchange for their contribution.126 In reward-based 
crowdfunding, contributors are promised goods or services in exchange 
for their contribution.127 In the lending-based model, the crowdfunder 
is repaid over time; thus, federal securities laws might apply.128 Finally, 
equity-based crowdfunding generally refers to the issuance of corporate 
stock in the startup through a crowdfunding site. Due to securities and 
regulatory issues, equity crowdfunding has been described as 
“practically nonexistent in the United States.”129 Legislation enacted in 
2012130 sought to provide a registration exemption for equity 
crowdfunding. Whether the proposed SEC regulations131 implementing 
that legislation will be sufficient to make equity crowdfunding feasible 
remains debated.132 
The key question for our purposes is how, if at all, crowdfunding 
legislation impacts ISAs. The short answer is that while the 
crowdfunding exemption may apply to some ISAs, it likely will not 
apply to all ISAs. Moreover, efforts to provide clarity in securities 
regulation and protect investors, while valuable, do not address the 
protection of funding seekers—the young persons, entrepreneurs, and 
students who have monetized their human capital. Finally, the 
crowdfunding literature simply does not address the most fundamental 
normative question raised by ISAs: what does it mean that ISA 
investors are not investing in a company, an activity, or a business but 
 125.  See id. at 31–35; see also Christine Hurt, Price Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and 
Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 233–34; Mary M. Shepro, Keeping the Crowd at 
Bay: The Practice Implications of the SEC’s New Crowdfunding Exemption, 1, 9 (May 5, 2014) 
(unpublished paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433225.  
 126.  See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 121, at 31–32; Shepro, supra note 125, at 10 (providing 
GoFundMe.com as an example of a purely donative crowdfunding site). 
 127.  Kickstarter, a popular crowdfunding site, operates on the reward-based model; 
entrepreneurs offer rewards (such as copies of the book or film created) in exchange for support. 
See https://www.kickstarter.com/hello?ref=footer, archived at http://perma.cc/C46N-U5DB (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015).  
 128.  See Bradford, supra note 121, at 34–42. 
 129.  See Shepro, supra note 125, at 10–11 (citing MASSSOLUTION, 2013CF CROWDFUNDING 
MARKET OUTLOOK REPORT (July 2013)). However, because partnership and LLC interests can 
constitute securities, even sites that do not offer corporate stock may be subject to costly regulation 
under current rules. 
 130.  Jump Start Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Title III, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 131.  Regulation Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66427 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249).  
 132.  See, e.g., Shepro, supra note 125, at 18–24. 
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rather the totality of a person’s human capital? Such questions are the 
focus of this Article. 
 
*       *       * 
 
In sum, Part II has surveyed the universe of current ISAs and 
discussed their antecedents and related transactions. The foregoing 
discussion shows that ISAs are not completely new. However, in the 
past, informal income sharing transactions occurred more sporadically 
and locally and for the most part flew under the regulatory radar. We 
have now arguably reached a tipping point where technological 
advances and a financing crunch have led to the proliferation of ISAs 
on a wider scale. 
The law is just starting to tackle the normative and regulatory 
issues these transactions raise. Current law lacks both an analytical 
framework and a substantive approach for understanding, evaluating, 
and characterizing them. Developments in the regulation of 
crowdfunding, while informative, do not address many of the key issues. 
There is clearly a demand for regulatory guidance, as demonstrated by 
the discontinuation of the Upstart transaction due to regulatory 
uncertainty133 and the introduction of the Rubio-Petri Bill.134 The 
remainder of this Article elaborates on why, despite the desire for 
regulatory certainty, a case-by-case approach that regulates ISAs by 
analogy is the better path. 
III. EVALUATING AND CHARACTERIZING THE TRANSACTIONS 
ISAs raise two distinct but related issues: (1) how they should be 
regarded as a normative, public policy matter, and (2) how we should 
design their legal treatment and regulation. At the outset, both issues 
present a fundamental choice: Can we make broad normative 
statements about the desirability of ISAs and enact overarching legal 
and regulatory schemes by which to govern them? Or, alternatively, 
 133.  With regard to Pave, the public portion of the Pave website, which has always been less 
open, transparent, and detailed than that of Upstart, appears now only to offer a loan version. 
However, there are Pave webpages still accessible online that continue the description of an income 
share opportunity. See, e.g., Payback Process, PAVE, https://www.pave.com/learn-more#payback-
process, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8X7-4Y4V (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).  
 134.  Investing in Student Success Act of 2014, H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. (as introduced on Apr. 
9, 2014); see also supra note 27; PALACIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra note 14. 
 
          
706 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:3:681 
should their normative evaluation and legal treatment be considered 
and articulated on a case-by-case basis?135 
Fueled by a desire for regulatory certainty, there has emerged a 
nascent trend in favor of an overarching, unified regulatory 
approach.136 This approach has largely been advocated by legislators 
and policymakers who seek to provide regulatory certainty and a 
favorable regulatory environment for the ISA sector to develop. A 
unified approach may appear a natural solution given the seemingly 
distinctive economics of ISAs, as compared with more traditional 
methods of individual financing. This Article argues, however, that we 
should resist such a unified approach at this stage because, in its effort 
to secure certainty, the unified approach ignores potential risks posed 
by ISAs and creates unnecessary substantive law discontinuities. With 
respect to both normative evaluation and regulatory design, a case-by-
case approach offers a better opportunity for thoughtful regulation with 
meaningful certainty. A case-by-case analysis that is performed by each 
regulatory field is preferable because (1) ISAs are heterogeneous 
transactions with different underlying economics, and (2) ISAs may 
resemble a number of preexisting transactions, many of which already 
have established legal and regulatory treatments. Furthermore, it is 
possible to provide sufficient regulatory certainty while choosing a case-
by-case approach. 
Part III develops the argument that a case-by-case approach 
that proceeds by analogy to familiar regulatory categories is preferable 
at this juncture. Part III.A argues that a case-by-case approach is useful 
both in the normative evaluation of ISAs and in assessing their 
regulatory treatment. Parts III.B and III.C broadly describe the 
universe of key commercial transactions analogous to ISAs. Part III.B 
focuses on two analytical extremes: (1) the notion that ISAs 
approximate slavery or servitude, and (2) the idea that ISAs are no 
different from traditional debt. Part III.C then discusses other potential 
analogies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 135.  A third possibility is to not regulate ISAs at all. However, not subjecting ISAs to any 
regulatory oversight is unrealistic in today’s environment. Moreover, at least with respect to some 
areas of law (e.g., tax and bankruptcy), deciding the correct approach is not optional.  
 136.  See, e.g., PALACIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra note 14. 
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A. Policy Issues Raised by ISAs and the Case for a  
Case-By-Case Approach 
Part III.A first surveys the policy issues raised by ISAs and 
argues for case-by-case normative evaluation. It then discusses why 
case-by-case regulation by analogy is the preferable approach. 
1. Policy Issues Raised by ISAs and the Case for Case-by-Case 
Normative Evaluation 
Commentators—including journalists, bloggers, lawmakers, 
public intellectuals, and the offering enterprises themselves—have 
described ISAs in a number of different ways.137 These descriptions 
span the analytical spectrum, from the very pernicious (e.g., indentured 
servitude) to the quite banal (e.g., contingent debt or insurance). Each 
of these descriptions of ISAs carries different policy implications. The 
wide range of descriptions, paired with the strength of commentator 
reactions, suggests that ISAs are commercially and socially complicated 
and contested. 
Advocates of ISAs, including U.S. Senator Marco Rubio and 
former U.S. Representative Tom Petri, believe that ISAs offer a more 
realistic means for financing higher education than traditional loans, 
which may leave students overindebted.138 The ISA model removes the 
student’s fixed obligation to repay principal, although at the “price” of 
surrendering a portion of the upside.139 Some argue that ISAs 
incentivize students to make better educational decisions.140 Others 
claim that the ISA sector taps into new sources of credit and makes it 
easier for entrepreneurs to obtain funding for a project or venture. Yet 
others suggest that these transactions enable funders to invest in 
communities.141 Still others characterize certain ISAs as a method of 
 137.  See infra Part III.B and III.C. 
 138.  See, e.g., Drew Sandholm, For Rubio, Student Loan Bill Is Personal, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2014, 
12:17 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101568230, archived at http://perma.cc/4VYV-NCTX; 
INVESTING IN STUDENT SUCCESS ACT OF 2014 FACT SHEET, available at https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20141219075210/https://petri.house.gov/sites/petri.house.gov/files/document
s/InvestingInStudentSuccess-FACTSHEET.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XVZ8-LWNU (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2015). Professor Miguel Palacios is a proponent of this view.  
 139.  See, e.g., Palacios, supra note 59. 
 140.  Bachelder, supra note 57; see also Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 530 (2013) (arguing that risk-based student loans would act as a price 
signal, improving students’ ability to make informed decisions regarding how financial risks differ 
between courses of study). 
 141.  13TH AVE FUNDING, supra note 7 (“Finance your education without debt—use our locally 
controlled, equity based technology to send members of your community through college.”). 
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insuring against earnings shocks.142 These commentaries suggest that 
ISAs may have a number of advantages over traditional methods of 
individual financing. 
On the other hand, several concerns and critiques have been 
raised concerning the emerging ISA sector. Detractors argue that ISAs 
create unacceptable ownership stakes in the young at the outset of their 
careers, akin to indentured servitude.143 Some suggest that ISAs allow 
corporations to own people.144 Such ownership may, in their view, 
approximate slavery.145 Detractors voice particular concern about 
consumer protection issues surrounding young people or those 
desperate for funding, who may make poor decisions.146 Even if these 
transactions do not rise to the level of slavery or servitude, they may 
raise important questions regarding personal autonomy, free choice, 
and self-determination. Commentators have also pointed out the likely 
inequities in who gets funded (e.g., based on race, gender, or profession), 
as well as potential design flaws (moral hazard and adverse selection in 
the pool of funding seekers).147 This increased risk to funding providers 
may result in ISAs being more costly for funding recipients than 
currently envisioned. As a result, some have emphasized the 
importance of consumer protection of funding recipients.148 
This Article does not purport to undertake a comprehensive 
survey of the types of policy issues raised by ISAs. The discussion here 
 142.  Katie Baker, Jocks & Bonds: Does the Arian Foster IPO Really Give Fans a Chance to 
Buy a Piece of an NFL Superstar?, GRANTLAND (Oct. 30, 2013), http://grantland.com/features/the-
arian-foster-ipo-fantex/, archived at http://perma.cc/PL68-MAGE (“The Fantex model can be 
looked at as an insurance policy of sorts to pros, particularly in the NFL, where contracts are not 
guaranteed and the average career length is less than four years.”); Mike Florio, Company Plans 
to Sell Stock in Players, Starting with Arian Foster, NBC SPORTS (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/10/17/company-plans-to-sell-stock-in-players-starting-
with-arian-foster/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZS74-6H73 (characterizing Fantex as “an insurance 
policy of sorts, paid in advance”); Sean Gregory, Be Very Careful Buying Arian Foster Shares, TIME 
(Oct. 18, 2013, 7:29 PM), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2013/10/18/be-very-careful-buying-
arian-foster-shares/, archived at http://perma.cc/C6P3-TGZY (noting the insurance function of 
Fantex). See also, generally, Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L.J. 1285, 1319–24 
(2011) (discussing equity interests in future earnings as a non-insurance example of a “risk-
allocating transaction” or “risk/expected value exchange”). 
 143.  See infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39:59) (discussing potential funding 
inequities based on demographic characteristics); see also PALACIOS, DESORRENTO & KELLY, supra 
note 14, at 10 (discussing possible funding inequities). For example, there is a worry that funding 
recipients may have an incentive to choose leisure over work, take lower paying jobs, or accept 
hometown discounts upon receiving the funds, thus compromising the return on the investment of 
funding providers. 
 148.  See Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 35:59–39:59). 
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is simply a brief overview of the types of issues ISAs may present. What 
is clear at the outset is that ISAs are contested and complicated 
transactions. They are also heterogeneous, so not all ISAs will raise the 
exact same policy concerns. Ultimately, whether a given agreement is 
desirable or problematic will depend in part on the economic terms of 
that particular contract, the circumstances surrounding its creation, 
and the relationship between the contracting parties. Because ISAs are 
not monolithic, it is difficult to make sweeping normative statements 
about ISAs as a whole. For that reason, we suggest that each contract 
should be normatively evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Comparison, 
analogy, and classification can be useful in this normative evaluation. 
Comparing ISAs to more familiar transactions can help clarify potential 
arguments and concerns, because we can piggyback on implicit or 
explicit normative assessments of existing categories in deciding how 
we feel about specific ISAs. Comparison and analogy can also help 
pinpoint—based on careful examination of the economics underlying 
each discrete transaction—whether and when a particular transaction 
raises concerns. For example, understanding how a given ISA is or is 
not like insurance can help clarify whether it is plausible to argue that 
ISAs allow smoothing of earnings and consumption shocks. 
Understanding how an ISA may or may not resemble indentured 
servitude may illuminate the potential ethical problems that it creates. 
In sum, thinking about how ISAs compare with arrangements 
with which we are familiar can help us better understand and articulate 
our normative attitudes towards them. Of course, merely drawing 
analogies is insufficient. Some new ISAs may raise fresh issues that 
existing transactions do not implicate. The process of analogizing may 
also force us to rethink the wisdom of our longstanding acceptance of 
familiar financial transactions. Our narrower point is that the work of 
analogy and comparison can serve as a heuristic in helping us frame 
and evaluate the new ISAs in a quickly changing landscape. 
2. The Case for Case-By-Case Regulation by Analogy 
With respect to designing the legal and regulatory treatment of 
ISAs, a case-by-case approach that draws analogies to preexisting 
transactions is also likely to be preferable.149 
 149.  See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 15 (borrowing products liability concepts to 
suggest consumer credit regulation approaches). 
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a. Benefits of Regulation by Analogy 
Regulation of ISAs by analogy to more familiar arrangements is 
advisable for two reasons: 
First, as mentioned, ISAs are heterogeneous. Some are 
structured using intermediate entities, while others are peer-to-peer.150 
Some are pooled funds while others are not.151 Some may attempt to 
circumscribe the activities of the funding recipients while others may 
not.152 Furthermore, new variants are likely to develop. Given this 
heterogeneity, enacting new regulatory schemes to govern ISAs at this 
stage may be either over- or underinclusive and may miss some of the 
issues that will arise, simply because we have not yet had enough 
experience or time to determine the pitfalls, potential abuses, 
alternative structures, and potential workarounds. 
Second, many ISAs economically resemble existing 
arrangements that are already governed by established legal and 
regulatory regimes. Analogizing each new ISA to familiar transactions 
may suggest the types of rules and protections that should apply. There 
is no reason not to benefit from regulatory insights and approaches 
already developed for economically similar transactions. 
Given the heterogeneity of ISAs and their resemblance to more 
familiar arrangements, efficiency and equity considerations suggest 
that if an ISA is economically comparable to another transaction, both 
should receive similar treatment under the law. From an equity 
perspective, if two transactions are economically identical, they should 
be treated identically as an analytical starting point, and the 
 150.  For example, Pave was designed to be a peer-to-peer financing arrangement. See supra 
Part II.A.3. In contrast, Upstart interposed itself, or a related trust entity, between the investors 
and the funding seeker. See supra Part II.A.2; see also Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 269 n.16. 
151.  See supra Part II.A.4.a (Lumni as an example of a structure using pooling); see also 
Charles Luzar, Pave Has Crowdfunded Individuals . . . Now They Will Fund Groups, CROWDFUND 
INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2014, at 9:00 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/02/31292-pave-
crowdfunded-individuals-now-want-fund-groups/ (Pave introducing the opportunity for Backers to 
invest in a group of individuals to facilitate investor diversification). 
 152.  For example, under the Fantex structure, the funding recipient is expected to remain 
engaged in the specified sports-related activities for a minimum period of time (except in the case 
of injury or other enumerated events). Fantex, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Form S-1) 6 (Nov. 21, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1573683/000104746913010747/a2217440zs-1.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/BXP6-R6EW. Both 
Upstart and Pave emphasize how their funding structure constitutes an investment in the person 
and not the activity. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 267; PAVE, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140106223438/http://www.pave.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
WK2Y-9DAK (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (describing the Pave agreement as an investment “in an 
individual, not a project or company”). Under the Upstart contract, the funding recipient makes 
payments based on a percentage of the income listed on Line 22 of the tax return, which is not 
limited to any particular activity or line of business. Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 270. 
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government should be prepared to explain any disparate treatment.153 
From an efficiency perspective, treating two economically similar 
transactions differently may create distortions and incentivize people 
to enter into one over the other solely for regulatory reasons.154 
We do not argue that deviations from identical treatment should 
never occur. In certain cases, it may be advisable to regulate a unique 
industry or activity under special rules. However, this should be done 
only after careful consideration and for sound policy reasons.155 Because 
ISAs are so new, the initial default should be comparable treatment 
until good reasons can be articulated for doing something different. The 
worry is that designing a new unified regulatory regime at the outset 
might have the unintended effect of drawing numerous new lines 
between like-kind transactions without a thorough understanding of 
where the lines are and where the resulting distortions are likely to 
be.156 It is also possible that any new regulatory regime enacted at this 
time may be less protective of funding recipients than existing 
regulatory regimes might be. The better approach is regulation by 
analogy on a case-by-case basis until the sector is more developed. 
b. Possible Objections to the Case-by-Case Approach 
There are potential counterarguments to our suggested 
approach. First, it might be argued that regulation by analogy itself 
creates arbitrage by allowing parties to pick their desired regulatory 
regime based on similarities to existing transactions.157 It may also 
create arbitrage opportunities between fields, whereby transactions 
could be structured to receive one label for purposes of field A and 
another for purposes of field B. Yet, this is no different than the world 
we currently inhabit. For example, parties willing to undertake the 
economics of debt already receive debt treatment. Similarly, parties 
have long been able to exploit arbitrage opportunities between fields. 
 153.  See James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135, 139 
(2012) (arguing that equity—horizontal and vertical—has no independent normative content, but 
the concept plays a role in demanding that a government communicate its rationale for different 
treatment). 
 154.  See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 16, at 1631 (observing that where a line is drawn, 
“taxpayers will change their behavior to take advantage of the line. . . [creating] efficiency 
effects.”). 
 155.  Id. at 1661–62 (urging a general approach of taxing close substitutes comparably). 
 156.  See generally Strnad, supra note 16, at 571–72, 574 (critiquing an approach to taxing 
new financial instruments that would apply a single regulatory regime to all new instruments, on 
the grounds that “instruments with nearly identical cash flows may incur very different tax 
liabilities.”). 
 157.  See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010) 
(describing the “first comprehensive theory of regulatory arbitrage”). 
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Any reforms of this systemic reality should take place as part of a 
broader conversation.158 
Second, it might be argued that the case-by-case approach 
creates regulatory uncertainty that could stifle a burgeoning industry. 
We offer two responses to this critique. We agree that the decision by 
Upstart to suspend new ISA issuances and Pave’s decision to emphasize 
loans may be due in part to regulatory uncertainty. But we contend the 
answer is not quick enactment of broad and inconsistent ISA 
legislation. Reform efforts should not conflate regulatory certainty with 
creation of a unified legal regime for ISAs. It is possible to generate 
greater certainty while eschewing substantive uniformity by pursuing 
regulation by analogy. This could be done, for example, by employing 
carefully tailored prototype guidance issued by the relevant regulatory 
authorities, which could act as narrowly crafted safe harbors. This is an 
approach already utilized by regulators in various contexts.159 
Additionally, despite its tempting allure of certainty, substantive 
uniformity in the treatment of ISAs does not necessarily guarantee 
regulatory certainty in application. A unified approach would likely 
cause problems due to the creation of unnecessary legal distinctions and 
distortions. Furthermore, some uncertainty is not inherently bad. As 
noted, ISAs, while promising, also contain pitfalls. A degree of 
regulatory uncertainty may act as a friction against aggressive versions 
of these transactions at the margins.160 
Third, it is possible that in certain cases, regulation by analogy 
may lead to the wrong result. Two transactions may be economically 
similar, yet regulation by analogy may produce an illogical outcome. For 
example, a transaction that is not the closest analogy for the ISA could, 
in practice, serve as its closest substitute in the marketplace. In such 
circumstances, it might be sensible to consider regulatory treatment 
consistent with the closest substitute, rather than the closest analogy. 
We do not contend that regulation by analogy will always reach the 
right result. In cases where it does not, it may be appropriate to consider 
deviating from the rule of choosing the most analogous transaction. But 
158.  For example, see the conversation regarding reforming the tax treatment of the cost of 
capital and the distinction between debt and equity. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Fundamental Tax 
Reform, 48 EMORY L. J. 809 (1999); David Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation 
of Financial Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397 (2004); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction 
in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2000); Daniel Shaviro, Risk Based Rules and the 
Taxation of Capital Income. 50 TAX L. REV. 643 (1995); Graeme S. Cooper, Coordinating 
Inconsistent Choices–The Problem of Hybrids (Dec. 14, 2014) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538276. 
 159.  See RILEY, supra note 18. 
 160.  See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1312, 1331 (2001) (tax uncertainty may prevent a structure “from becoming pervasive”). 
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such deviation should be undertaken for clearly articulated reasons, in 
circumscribed contexts. In general, regulating based on careful 
analogies to existing rules and regimes remains the better course. 
Finally, unified regulation might provide benefits that are 
absent in our approach. For example, creation of a clear and unified 
regulatory scheme may allow regulators to direct the development of 
the young industry and to put a stamp of approval on “good” 
transactions by protecting them. It may give rise to certainty, which can 
facilitate development of the “good” parts of the industry. However, 
these benefits should not be overstated. 
Lawmakers and regulators have a long history of not 
anticipating the variants that an industry can create. There are real 
risks of being overinclusive in defining a “good transaction.” These 
tendencies might be exacerbated by the presence of interest groups and 
the possibility of regulatory capture.161 Many of those calling for a 
unified regulatory regime strongly support ISAs and may not 
appreciate (or may be understating) the downsides they present. Given 
these realities, any unified scheme that is enacted would most likely be 
overly broad.162 
Furthermore, regulatory certainty itself will not necessarily 
ensure that desired transactions flourish. Recently proposed SEC 
regulations sought to facilitate certain types of crowdfunding. However, 
some commentators speculate that the new rules will be inadequate to 
persuade market actors to pursue new offerings.163 Successful 
regulation requires understanding the actors, their concerns, and the 
consequences of regulations, all of which depends on experience. 
c. Concluding Thoughts on Regulation by Analogy 
For the foregoing reasons, we believe that a case-by-case 
approach that draws analogies to more familiar transactions is 
 161.  See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (noting a view that where “relevant decisionmakers operate 
without any oversight, they tend to deliver benefits to well organized interest groups at the public’s 
expense”); see also Jonathan S. Masur & Eric Posner, Toward a Pigovian State, 164 U. PENN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (critiquing governments’ propensity to use command and control 
regulations rather than more efficient Pigovian taxes and noting the role of interest groups in the 
design of regulation); Oren Bar-Gill & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulation as Delegation (Feb. 25, 2015) 
(unpublished paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570669 
(considering how different regulatory techniques map onto different levels of delegation of decision 
making to the state). 
 162.  We are open to the possibility of a narrowly crafted safe harbor—for example, one that 
protects peer-to-peer transactions of short duration and small income sharing percentage. Any 
such safe harbor should be carefully designed to avoid the dangers we have discussed here.  
 163.  See Shepro supra note 132. 
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preferable to pursuing a unified framework for the new transactions at 
this time. 
We do not argue that regulators and lawmakers should stand 
back and ignore ISAs, letting them grow unfettered.164 Rather, we 
recommend building on the rules and protections already developed 
with respect to other arrangements, and borrowing from those concepts 
in regulating the new transactions. This is a particularly reasonable 
approach given the recent advances in consumer protections for 
consumer financial products.165 We are concerned that the creation of 
new legal rules and regulations at this juncture is less likely to be well-
tailored and adequately protective of consumers and investors.166 While 
there may be some benefits of a unified regime that are forgone by 
choosing a case-by-case approach, these benefits are outweighed by the 
merits. 
B. The Analytical Extremes: Human Ownership? Or Debt? 
Having argued for case-by-case regulation by analogy, the 
remainder of Part III discusses the universe of arrangements to which 
ISAs might be analogized. Part III.B examines two analytical extremes: 
(1) the parallel between ISAs and slavery or servitude and (2) the idea 
that ISAs are simply a form of contingent debt. Part III.C examines 
other possible analogies. 
1. Income Share Agreements as Slavery or Indentured Servitude 
Even though ISAs obviously do not create direct property rights 
in humans, the worry is that they might approximate such property 
rights via financial contract. Upstart has been characterized in the 
popular press as possibly being “a modern form of indentured 
 164.  Cf. Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (1998) (showing 
why the claim that cyberspace cannot be effectively regulated by the government is flawed); Saule 
T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking,” 63 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1042 (2009) (arguing that Office of the Comptroller of the Currency decisions to 
expand U.S. commercial banks’ ability to engage in derivatives trading in a largely unregulated 
environment contributed to the financial crisis in 2008). 
 165.  See, for example, the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) in 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011 
124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012)). 
 166.  See, e.g., Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1629, 1637 (2011) (contending that “regulatory capture [is] a more pronounced problem 
for consumer protection” regulation); see also Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: 
Financial Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267 (2012) (arguing that introducing 
financial regulation in stages may be a better approach for managing risk and avoiding unintended 
consequences). 
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servitude.”167 The Fantex transaction has been described as owning a 
NFL athlete and as “creepy.”168 Similar accounts can be found in a 
variety of commentaries.169 The offering startups themselves have also, 
to varying degrees, characterized these instruments as resembling 
human ownership.170 
These descriptions, if accurate, raise clear public policy and 
regulatory concerns.171 If an arrangement too closely resembles 
servitude or slavery, we already have legal and ethical frameworks for 
thinking about it. For example, we might consider whether the 
transaction should be subject to constitutional scrutiny,172 whether it 
 167.  Elliot Hannon, Is This Indentured Servitude or the New Venture Capital?, SLATE (Oct. 
29, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/10/29/companies_look_to_loan_ 
you_money_in_return_for_a_percentage_of_your_future.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HTM7-
MRDY.  
 168.  Matt Levine, Football Player Derivatives Are the Best Derivatives, BLOOMBERGVIEW 
(Nov. 1, 2013, 4:13 PM) http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-11-01/football-player-
derivatives-are-the-best-derivatives, archived at http://perma.cc/H3AR-FB23 (“The squick factor 
is obvious—you’re buying a person! indentured servitude! etc. . . . .”); Jonathan Mahler, Want to 
Buy Stock in an NFL Running Back?, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 29, 2013, 2:47 PM), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-10-29/want-to-buy-stock-in-an-nfl-running-back-, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5J7B-LRDP (“The first initial public offering for an athlete is under 
way!”). 
 169.  See, e.g., Ken Previti, The American School for Indentured Servants, RECLAIM REFORM 
(June 19, 2013), http://reclaimreform.com/2013/06/19/the-american-school-for-indentured-
servants/, archived at http://perma.cc/T6R4-NQPY (“College age students are being legally 
indentured”); Kevin Robertson, Owning a Player: Fantex and the Arian Foster IPO, THE SPORTS 
LAW CANARY (Nov. 23, 2013), http://sportslawnews.wordpress.com/2013/11/23/owning-a-player-
fantex-and-the-arian-foster-ipo/, archived at http://perma.cc/SVJ3-HC5J (“There is something 
morally wrong for a society that has moved past slavery to then allow a person to become indebted 
to another for life.”); David von Ebers, Athletes for Sale, THIS WEEK IN BLACKNESS (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://thisweekinblackness.com/david-von-ebers/athletes-for-sale/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
ST2P-UFZY (noting that “[t]he very idea of ‘owning’ a piece of an athlete is unsettling” and that 
“the concept evokes images of slavery, albeit highly paid slavery”); see also Oei & Ring, supra note 
3, at 267 nn.3–7 (providing further examples). But see Mark O’Neill, Upstart: Backers Invest in 
You, and Your Future Earnings Repay Them, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://smallbiztrends.com/2014/02/upstart-backers-invest-future-student-earnings.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8DP5-8WYG (calling criticism of Upstart “harsh” because the program gives a 
person the “start he or she needs” and “[limits] backers in the amount they get in return”); James 
Surowiecki, The New Futurism, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 4, 2013, http:// 
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/04/the-new-futurism, archived at http://perma.cc/D9EM-
QW8E (noting that although some people describe this funding as “indentured servitude. . . . the 
analogy is flawed”). 
 170.  See Fund Your Future, UPSTART, http://web.archive.org/web/20140419222848/zzhttps:// 
www.upstart.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/K7HR-5RE4 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (“By 
borrowing from their future selves, upstarts can make the best decisions for their lives today.”). 
Another Upstart ad characterized ISAs as transactions in which “people invest in people.” Upstart 
Ad on BOSTON.COM (Apr. 22, 2014) (on file with the authors); see also How It Works, PAVE, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140327134603/http://www.pave.com/how-it-works, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HF6L-82YB (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (“Talent is an asset”). 
 171.  See Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 272–73 (discussing some of these concerns). 
 172.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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might violate the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867,173 whether it might 
violate treaty obligations,174 or whether it should otherwise be banned 
on public policy grounds.175 
The involuntary servitude/slavery characterization may seem 
inapt because there are clear differences between ISAs and slavery or 
indentured servitude as commonly understood.176 ISAs do not actually 
make a person someone else’s property. They do not force funding 
recipients to work for funding providers.177 Work done is compensated, 
and there are often no formal restrictions on choice of work.178 
On the other hand, the analogy is not entirely unfounded.179 
First, the comparison should not be taken literally. Commentators are 
obviously not suggesting that ISAs are identical to slave or indentured 
servant relationships, as those terms have been understood in our 
cultural context. Rather, the significant point is that ISAs trigger 
reflexive comparisons to slavery or servitude for some observers. The 
real question is, what is it about these transactions and the rights they 
convey that generates this response? 
For example, the possibility of an investor capturing an overly 
large return, or taking too large a percentage, may elicit a reaction that 
 173.  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012). 
 174.  Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery § I, art. 1, April 30, 1957, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20266/v266.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
LF8J-FQ8N.   
 175.  Such public policy restrictions would not be unprecedented. See, e.g., National Organ 
Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–507, § 301, 98 Stat. 2339, 2346 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 274e) (making it illegal to “transfer any human organ for valuable consideration”); see also 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739 (2010) (discussing legal regulation 
and constraints on markets for various “taboo transactions”). 
 176.  See Kyle Chayka, Investing in Human Capital, Literally, PAC. STANDARD, Mar. 26, 2014, 
http://www.psmag.com/navigation/business-economics/investing-human-capital-literally-77448/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9PTP-8RYC (“Crowd-investing . . . actually seems more like a guild or 
apprenticeship system.”); O’Neill, supra note 169 (if these transactions “give[ ] the person the start 
he or she needs, and backers are limited in the amount they get in return, calling it indentured 
servitude seems like harsh criticism”).  
 177.  Cf. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227–29 (1911). In that case, Bailey obtained $15 
from a corporation in exchange for agreeing to work for a year at $12 a month, $1.25 of which 
would go to the corporation. An Alabama law treating failure to perform without just cause as 
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud violated the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 178.  But see Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 25 (stating that if Davis “retires from the 
NFL . . . within two years following [the stock] offering, other than as a result of injury, illness or 
medical condition, [Fantex] . . . may elect in our sole discretion to terminate the brand contract” 
and Davis must repay the funded amount net of amounts already repaid). 
 179.  See WILLIAM C. RHODEN, FORTY MILLION DOLLAR SLAVES: THE RISE, FALL, AND 
REDEMPTION OF THE BLACK ATHLETE (2007). 
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there is excessive control over another human.180 The fact that some 
ISAs involve market-based, commodifying valuations of the recipient’s 
human capital may accentuate their property and ownership-like 
aspects.181 If the investor’s interest in the future income stream is 
tradable, this may also emphasize the ownership-like aspects, as may 
the race-based dimensions of some ISAs.182 The presence of minimum 
payment amounts, minimum work periods, or default clauses may also 
suggest servitude.183 
Second and relatedly, slavery and servitude are themselves 
distinct and multifaceted institutions.184 While slavery in the United 
States generally involved a property interest in the enslaved person, 
indentured servitude was a kind of debt bondage. In exchange for a 
benefit (e.g., free passage), the indentured servant was required to work 
for a number of years to pay off his indenture.185 Both institutions have 
also varied depending on geographical and historical context. For 
example, historians have identified differences in U.S. slavery 
depending on time period (eighteenth vs. nineteenth century), 
geography (north vs. south), and gender and age of those enslaved.186 A 
full discussion of slavery and indentured servitude—particularly as 
 180.  Such concerns may also underlie characterization of industrial worker working 
conditions as “wage slavery.” See, e.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE 
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 60–97 (1998); Lea S. 
Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 474 (1989) 
(discussing the “wage slavery” debate in the labor movement). 
 181.  The question of what types of market transfers should be allowed is the subject of a 
robust literature on commodification. See generally MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, 
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW & CULTURE (2005); MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (2001); Krawiec, supra note 175 (discussing “taboo 
transactions”); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1849–52 
(1987) (developing a “human flourishing” theory of “market inalienability”). 
 182.  See sources cited supra note 181; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: 
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Anthony Paul Farley, The Black 
Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 458–61 (1997). 
 183.  See Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 25.  
 184.  See sources cited infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text; see also GUNTHER PECK, 
REINVENTING FREE LABOR: PADRONES AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST, 
1880–1930, at 82–112 (2000).  
 185.  Alfred L. Brophy, Law and Indentured Servitude in Mid-Eighteenth Century 
Pennsylvania, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 69, 85 (1991); Sharon V. Salinger, Labor, Markets, and 
Opportunity: Indentured Servitude in Early America, 38 LAB. HIST. 311, 314 (1997); see also 
sources cited infra note 186. 
 186.  See STACEY K. CLOSE, ELDERLY SLAVES OF THE PLANTATION SOUTH (1997); ELIZABETH 
FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD 146–192 (1988) (discussing lives of elderly 
slaves); DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 
(1999); WILMA KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2d 
ed. 2011); JOHN BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM 
SOUTH 149–190, 223–322 (1979) (discussing stereotypes, institutional roles, and the family in 
slavery). 
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understood by popular commentators—is beyond the scope of this 
Article. The key point is that the analogy between ISAs and slavery or 
servitude should not be cursorily dismissed. ISAs do create some degree 
of impingement on one’s right to reap the fruits of one’s own human 
capital. The relevant question is whether a given ISA so impinges on 
this right as to replicate or approximate some servitude or slavery-like 
characteristics in a modern-day financial transaction. 
Third, while ISAs would probably not run afoul of the Thirteenth 
Amendment under current court interpretations, the analysis cannot 
stop there. Although the Thirteenth Amendment has been narrowly 
construed and is unlikely to implicate financing transactions,187 various 
scholars have advocated a broader jurisprudence.188 Furthermore, even 
if a transaction is not unconstitutional, lawmakers may decide to 
restrict or prohibit it on public policy grounds. This has been done with 
transactions considered unacceptably commodifying or exploitative, 
such as sales of certain body parts.189 ISAs share some of these 
commodification concerns. 
The deeper question, then, is whether ISAs contractually 
approximate servitude, slavery, or some other type of commodifying or 
exploitative relationship as a result of the underlying rights and 
relationships they create. Because different agreements parcel out 
 187.  See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 931 (1988) (“[T]he term ‘involuntary 
servitude’ necessarily means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the 
defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of 
coercion through law or the legal process.”). But see Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) 
(explaining a Florida statute creating a presumption of fraud from nonperformance of contract for 
labor violated the Thirteenth Amendment and Anti-Peonage Act).  
 188.  Samuel L. Bufford & Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Problems in the 2005 
Bankruptcy Amendments, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 27–36 (2008) (examining possibility that 
involuntary Chapter 11 plans may violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Karen Gross, The Debtor 
as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 169 
(1990) (suggesting that a debtor “has sufficient aspects in common with a peon” to implicated the 
Thirteenth Amendment); James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the 
Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1502–15 (2010) (articulating a 
standard for evaluating labor claims under the Involuntary Servitude Clause of the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 189.  See sources cited supra notes 175 and 181 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., G.S. 
Becker & J.J. Elias, Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations, 
21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 9 (2007) (noting that the current legislation prohibits payments for organs); 
S. Leider & A.E. Roth, Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?, 10 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 
1221, 1221 (2010) (discussing the National Organ Transplant Act and “repugnance” toward selling 
kidneys); Erik Malmqvist, Are Bans on Kidney Sales Unjustifiably Paternalistic?, 28 BIOETHICS 
110, 114–17 (2014) (listing arguments for and against legislation concerning the sale of kidneys); 
A.J. Matas, The Case for Living Kidney Sales: Rationale, Objections and Concerns, 4 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANT 2007, 2009–13 (2004) (discussing a myriad of concerns including “exploitation of the 
poor” and “commodification of the body”); Julian Savulescu, Is the Sale of Body Parts Wrong? 29 J. 
MED. ETHICS 138, 138–39 (2003) (noting that selling organs may force the poor into the market). 
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different rights, one cannot conclude whether a given ISA approximates 
servitude or slavery without a case-by-case analysis. We propose a 
multifactor framework for doing such analysis in Part IV. 
2. Income Share Agreements as Debt 
At the other end of the analytical spectrum, ISAs might be 
regarded as simply a form of contingent debt. Both debt and ISAs 
involve a transfer of funds up front in return for payments under a 
contract. Upstart itself initially characterized its arrangement as 
essentially a loan in its transaction documents.190 Debt characterization 
typically leads to the normative conclusion that, despite their 
distinctive marketing, ISAs are not special. The corresponding 
regulatory conclusion is that, because debt is a familiar form of 
individual financing that falls under well-developed regulatory 
regimes, few or no new regulatory structures are needed to govern ISAs. 
There are clear similarities between ISAs and debt, and some 
ISAs may look so much like debt that they are economically 
indistinguishable. The fact that ISAs are income contingent might not 
prevent a debt designation. Individuals have long entered into lending 
transactions in which interest rates vary based on market interest rates 
or other benchmarks.191 Depending on other investor protections, an 
ISA with repayment contingent on future earnings could be viewed as 
just another type of variable rate debt.192 
Debt characterization may be buttressed in cases where the 
funding provider receives robust protections from downside risk, for 
example, through deferral clauses that extend the repayment term in 
years where the funding recipient’s income is too low. The return on 
investment may also appear more fixed and debt-like in the case of 
agreements that cap the upside return, although high upsides can be 
found in some payday-lending arrangements as well and do not 
preclude debt characterization.193 As discussed in Part II, some 
 190.  See Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 273–74 (describing Upstart’s shifting characterization).   
 191.  For example, interest rates linked to LIBOR (London Inter-bank Offered Rate), or Bond 
Buyer’s 20 bond index (used to establish cost of municipal, tax-free debt). See Bond Buyer's 20 
Bond Index, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/rates/interest-rates/bond-buyer-20-bond-
index.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/KDF3-249M (last visited Feb. 14, 2015); LIBOR, Other 
Interest Rate Indexes, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/rates/interest-rates/libor.aspx, 
archived at, http://perma.cc/N3QW-8USK (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
 192.  Surowiecki, supra note 169 (“[A]t root, a human-capital contract is what’s called an 
income-contingent loan: how much you pay back depends on how much you earn.”). But see I.R.C. 
§ 351(g) (2012) (borderline instruments receive equity treatment). 
 193.  See, e.g., Alex Kaufman, Payday Lending Regulation 1–7 (Finance and Econ. Discussion 
Series, Div. of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 
2013-62, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201362/201362pap.pdf, 
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transactions do place floors and ceilings on the repayment obligations 
of the funding recipients, and future variants could certainly move 
further in this direction.194 
However, the debt analogy may not sufficiently capture the full 
complexity of the new ISAs. There is arguably a distinction between 
debt instruments that vary based on a market interest rate or other 
benchmark and an instrument that varies based on a person’s future 
earnings.195 The latter may look more like an ownership interest in 
human capital than the former, and debt characterization may not 
capture this nuance. Furthermore, in most ISAs there is no formal 
obligation to repay the principal amount, even if there are informal 
pressures, which means additional risk for the funding provider.196 
Thus, like the servitude or slavery analogy, whether an ISA can 
be classified or analogized as debt will depend on the economics of the 
individual transaction. Of course, just because a transaction looks like 
debt does not mean it is unproblematic. If anything, comparing and 
analogizing to more traditional forms of lending illuminates the risks 
and potential problems with both ISAs and traditional debt. Our point 
is simply that if an ISA is closely analogous to debt, we should consider 
borrowing from existing normative and regulatory approaches that 
apply to traditional debt in designing that ISA’s legal treatment. 
C. The Equity-Like Gray Zone 
Apart from slavery/servitude and debt characterization, ISAs 
may also be analogized to other arrangements that are not debt but do 
not rise to the level of human ownership. Broadly speaking, there are 
three basic categories of such “gray-zone” analogies: (1) corporate 
equity, (2) partnership or joint venture, and (3) a residual category of 
other arrangements that look like equity but may be something else. 
archived at http://perma.cc/LX32-LKQE (reviewing policy issues surrounding payday lending); 
Rachel Swan, San Francisco Start-Up Drafts 49er Vernon Davis for IPO Roster S.F. WEEKLY: THE 
SNITCH BLOG (Oct. 31, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2013/10 
/vernon_davis_fantex.php, archived at http://perma.cc/JC3Y-JCJU (noting that athletes may not 
necessarily come out ahead in these deals). 
 194.  For example, Upstart’s transaction capped repayments at three times the amount 
funded. See UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28 and accompanying text. Pave’s has an 
effective cap of five times the amount funded. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 195.  But see I.RC. § 351(g) (nonqualified preferred stock not treated as stock). 
 196.  Note that some agreements have deferral clauses and minimum employment clauses 
meant to mitigate investor risk. See sources cited supra notes 31, 32, and 46 and accompanying 
text; see also Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 6 (two-year minimum period of NFL activity).  
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1. The Corporate Equity Analogy 
A frequently heard claim is that ISAs resemble corporate equity, 
a de facto incorporation of humans.197 News articles and blog posts 
proclaim that “[n]ew crowdfunding platforms let you sell stock in 
yourself” and speak of “how normal people are becoming 
corporations.”198 Equity characterization of ISAs can also be found in 
the academic literature: Friedman and Kuznets characterized human 
capital contracts as sales of stock in humans, and other scholars have 
noted this characterization as well.199 Just as commentators raising 
slavery and servitude concerns likely do not mean that ISAs literally 
replicate historical slavery, those who make a corporate analogy 
understand that humans have not actually been incorporated.200 
Rather, the imagery of incorporating a human captures an overall sense 
that an ISA may allocate, via financial contract, ownership claims in a 
human in a manner reminiscent of how stock divides up ownership of a 
“corporate” person. 
More precisely, the corporate equity analogy draws a parallel to 
corporate finance, in which businesses raise capital by either borrowing 
(i.e., debt financing) or by issuing shares in exchange for a capital 
contribution (i.e., equity financing). Despite their common purpose, 
debt and equity are treated differently under the law. Equity suggests 
ownership of the enterprise as opposed to a mere creditor relationship. 
An equity owner generally is understood to have not only an interest in 
the upside of business performance but also greater exposure to the 
downside of business failure.201 Debt holders have rights to get repaid 
 197.  See, e.g., KOLLIN & KOLLIN, supra note 11; Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2:59–
3:59).  
 198.  Adrianne Jeffries, New Crowdfunding Platforms Let You Sell Stock in Yourself (Feb. 26, 
2013, at 2:30 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/2/26/4031938/new-crowdfunding-platforms-let-
you-sell-stock-in-yourself, archived at http://perma.cc/7XYJ-CMQF; Kevin Roose, The IPO of You 
and Me: How Normal People are Becoming Corporations, THE VERGE (Nov. 19, 2013, 9:05 AM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/11/ipo-of-you-and-me.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/SJ28-Y7U4 (“What do Twitter, Berkshire Hathaway, and your best friend Dave have in 
common? Pretty soon, you might be able to buy stock in all three.”); see Alison Griswold, Because 
You’re Worth It (Apr. 10, 2014, 2:28 PM) http://www.slate.com/articles/business/ 
moneybox/2014/04/income_share_agreements_instead_of_taking_out_loans_students_sell_stock.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/3U7L-DFAY (“Afraid of student loan debt? Sell stock in yourself 
instead.”). 
 199.  Friedman & Kuznets, supra note 10; Jacobs & van Wijnbergen, supra note 86, at 2–4; 
Schwartz, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2:59–3:59). 
 200.  See sources cited supra note 199. 
 201.  See, e.g., Comm’r v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935): 
The shareholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he takes the risk, and 
profits from success. The creditor, in compensation for not sharing the profits, is to be 
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irrespective of how the business is performing while equity owners do 
not.202 
Within the corporate equity rubric, it is possible to refine our 
thinking further. Extending the analogy, a human could be 
characterized as issuing (1) an equity-like stake akin to certain types of 
preferred shares (i.e., generally, seniority in repayment and a 
prenegotiated dividend amount, but no voting or control rights) in her 
entire self, or (2) an equity-like preferred stake in a specific enterprise 
that she has undertaken. The first construction most closely captures 
the view that the new transactions approximate the incorporation of 
humans, as opposed to the de facto interposition of a corporate entity 
between the individual and the enterprise she is conducting. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, the corporate equity analogy may 
not be satisfactory in some cases. First, the economics of the transaction 
might not suggest equity characterization. Some interests may be so 
protected from risk that they are effectively debt, not equity.203 Second, 
corporate dividends are not necessarily guaranteed. By contrast, in the 
ISA context, the income share must be paid to the funding provider. 
Third, other indicia of corporate equity may be absent, such as voting 
rights, low bankruptcy priority compared to debt, or limited liability. 
Finally, there may be no actual entity interposed between the investor 
and the funding recipient. 
Ultimately, the corporate equity analogy may make the most 
sense in cases where (1) funds have been raised to support the funding 
paid independently of the risk of success, and gets a right to dip into the capital when 
the payment date arrives. 
See also Crawford Drug Stores, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 292, 295–96 (10th Cir. 1955) (“[I]t 
is a common attribute of a debt that the holder thereof is entitled to interest thereon even though 
there are no net earnings. But in ordinary circumstances the holder of preferred stock has no such 
absolute right to the payment of dividends.”); I.R.S. Chief Counsel Adv. Mem., CCA 200134004, 
2001 WL 961299 (Aug. 24, 2001) (“One general difference between equity and debt is that an equity 
holder’s profit or loss depends on the success of the business venture, whereas a debt holder is 
entitled to his return without regard to the success of the business.”); JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
TAXATION, JCX-41-11, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF 
BUSINESS DEBT 15 (July 11, 2011), available at https://www.jct.gov/ 
publications.html?func=showdown&id=3803, archived at https://perma.cc/9WK3-M7GY. 
 202.  There are other legal consequences associated with holding debt as opposed to equity; a 
corporation generally owes fiduciary duties to shareholders not owed to bondholders except in 
cases of fraud, insolvency, or illegality. Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 302–03 (Del. 1988). 
Debtholders enter into different covenants than shareholders. Holders of debt, even convertible 
debt, also generally do not have rights to bring a derivative action. Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 
215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974). But see Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 F.R.D. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(convertible subordinated debenture holders had standing to sue in a derivative action); cf. N. Am. 
Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007) (noting that in 
Delaware, debtholder had rights to bring derivative action where corporation was insolvent). 
 203.  See sources cited supra notes 201–02 and accompanying text. 
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recipient’s business venture, as opposed to, say, the funding recipient’s 
education; and/or (2) an intermediate entity actually plays a key role in 
the arrangement. 
2. The Partnership Interest/Joint Venture Analogy 
ISAs may also be analogized to joint ventures or partnerships. 
The difference between the partnership/joint venture analogy and the 
corporate equity analogy is that the former does not attempt to 
interpose a corporate entity or posit de facto incorporation of the 
human. In a partnership or joint venture, the parties associate to carry 
out a business enterprise for profit, combining their skill, knowledge, 
money, and/or property to that end.204 While joint ventures and 
partnerships are not completely synonymous, they are overlapping 
categories without a clear distinction.205 Joint ventures are usually 
more limited than partnerships in scope, purpose, and duration.206 Yet, 
partnership law usually governs joint ventures.207 
The partnership/joint venture analogy leads to various legal and 
regulatory insights. In tax law, for example, a finding that an 
arrangement is in substance a partnership for tax purposes generally 
leads to a pass-through taxation regime with complex rules.208 In 
corporate law, while a corporation provides limited liability for the 
owners of the corporation, a common law general partnership will not 
 204.  Comm’r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949):  
[A Partnership exists when] considering all the facts—the agreement, the conduct of 
the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of 
disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and 
capital contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used, 
and any other facts throwing light on their true intent—the parties in good faith and 
acting with a business purpose intend to join together in the present conduct of the 
enterprise. 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2014); 106 AM. JUR. PROOF OF 
FACTS 3D 351 § 1 (2009) (describing partnership as “a combination of two or more persons of their 
property, effects, labor, or skill in a common business or venture, under an agreement to share the 
profits or losses in equal or specified proportions”). 
 205.  Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 694, 697 
(Ark. 1990) (stating that a joint venture must have elements of partnership); Weiner v. 
Fleischman, 816 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1991) (“The distinction between joint ventures and 
partnerships is not sharply drawn.”); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 5; 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures 
§ 3 (“The divergence between the two relations is still very slight and is difficult to ascertain in 
some circumstances.”).  
 206.  46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 5 (“[T]he principal difference between a partnership and 
a joint venture is that a partnership is ordinarily formed for the transaction of a general business, 
while a joint venture is usually limited to a single transaction.”). 
 207.  48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures § 3. 
 208.  See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing characterization as a partnership and the resulting tax 
implications). 
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necessarily provide comparable protection for its partners.209 In 
addition, the partnership/joint venture analogy may hold different 
nuances as a policymaking heuristic than the corporate analogy. 
Corporate equity connotes ownership and control, while a partnership 
analogy may tend to suggest a more cooperative advancement of a 
shared goal between the capital-providing partner and the services 
partner. Thus, analogizing to a partnership/joint venture relationship 
may lead to a more sanguine evaluation of ISAs. 
Yet, the partnership/joint venture analogy also poses conceptual 
challenges. As with the corporate equity analogy, it is unclear whether 
the underlying asset or enterprise is a circumscribed activity or the 
funding recipient herself. Two distinct variants are possible: (1) a 
partnership or joint venture arrangement between capital-providing 
partners and the funding recipient (as primarily a services partner) in 
the venture of her “life,” or (2) a partnership or joint venture 
arrangement between capital-providing partners and the funding 
recipient (as primarily a services partner), in which the venture is a 
circumscribed set of activities (e.g., football activities or a specific 
business venture). The first variant stretches our notion of partnership 
to a greater extent than the second.210 
Notably, the element of joint enterprise may be missing in some 
ISAs. For example, the funding providers may not be able to force the 
funding recipients to pursue certain careers or activities.211 Under 
common law, both partnership and joint venture arrangements 
generally feature an element of joint control.212 On the other hand, in 
limited partnerships, some limited partners may not necessarily 
exercise control over the business.213 In sum, despite conceptual 
 209.  The increase in available entity options, including LLCs, LLPs, and LPs, along with 
electivity of pass-through tax treatment, has diminished some of these differences. See, e.g., 
Heather M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box,” 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 524 (2009); Susan 
Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1519–21 
(1998). 
 210.  This is especially so because “traditional” partnerships would be treated as separate 
entities for some purposes, for example, when entering into contracts with other parties. The first 
variant makes it more difficulty to identify the “entity” in the ISA parallel.  
 211.  But see Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 25. 
 212.  A joint venture generally requires (1) an agreement to carry on the enterprise for profit; 
(2) evidence of an intent to be joint venturers; (3) contribution by each venturer of property, money, 
skill, or effort; (4) some joint control over the venture; and (5) provision for sharing of profits and 
losses. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 8 (2014). A partnership generally requires (1) the intent to 
be partners; (2) coownership of the business (including control over the business and profit and 
loss sharing); and (3) a profit motive. 106 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 351 § 8 (2009).  
 213.  See generally Carter G. Bishop, The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the 
Vanquished Control Rule Unwittingly Resurrected Lingering Limited Partner Estoppel Liability 
as Well as Full General Partner Liability?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 667 (2004) (describing history of 
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challenges (such as the lack of a separate legal entity), it is conceivable 
that the partnership/joint venture analogy may turn out to be the 
closest analogy for at least some ISAs, particularly ones that are strictly 
peer-to-peer, more informal, and more interactive. 
3. “Equity in Disguise” (i.e., Nonequity) 
Finally, ISAs resemble some arrangements that are not really 
equity at all. The following are some of the key possibilities.214 
a. Insurance 
Some ISAs may resemble insurance or risk-pooling 
arrangements, which are traditionally entered into to smooth 
consumption or earnings shocks. Insurance is, broadly speaking, the 
transfer of risk from an insured to the insurer in exchange for a price 
or premium.215 Many types of risks may be insured against, and a 
variety of arrangements may be characterized as insurance. For 
example, consumer bankruptcy is commonly characterized as a form of 
social insurance against economic distress.216 Procedures for requesting 
forbearance from tax collection may also be characterized as a form of 
social insurance.217 Insurance arrangements usually contain the 
elements of risk diversification and risk pooling: the insurer diversifies 
against the risk assumed by aggregating the risks of many into an 
actuarially sound insurance pool.218 The dual asymmetric information 
limited partner control rule and its elimination under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 
2001, § 303). 
 214.  In addition to the categories we describe, ISAs may also be reminiscent of other 
arrangements we have not discussed, such as apprenticeship arrangements, syndicates, contracts 
for services, and sales of body parts. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN F. HAMILTON, APPRENTICESHIP 
FOR ADULTHOOD: PREPARING YOUTH FOR THE FUTURE 153–86 (1990) (arguing for an “American-
Style Apprenticeship System”). 
 215.  43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance §§ 1–3 (defining the characteristics of insurance); ALLAN 
HERBERT WILLETT, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 71–73 (1951). 
 216.  Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 131 (2005) (noting “the general agreement that consumer 
bankruptcy functions at least partly as a form of social insurance”); Richard M. Hynes, Why 
(Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 153 (2004) (consumer bankruptcy “provides the 
consumer with a form of insurance that the consumer failed to purchase due to some form of 
market failure”). Under this conception, the pool of insureds is everyone eligible to file for 
consumer bankruptcy, the insurance premium is extracted by imposition of higher interest rates, 
and the payout comes in the form of debt forgiveness. 
 217.  See Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance and the Forgiveness 
of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 462–70 (2012).  
 218.  WILLETT, supra note 215, at 72 (“Wherever there is accumulation for uncertain losses, or 
wherever there is a transfer of risk, there is one element of insurance; only where these are joined 
with the combination of risks in a group is the insurance complete”). 
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concerns of adverse selection (the worry that only risky people will 
purchase insurance) and moral hazard (the worry that insureds will 
behave badly because they feel protected against risk) are features of 
most insurance schemes.219 
In addition to drawing parallels to equity, the financial press has 
characterized Fantex as insurance for the athlete against future injury 
or disability. The insurance payout comes in the form of a guaranteed 
sum up front, and the premiums are calculated as a percentage of future 
NFL earnings.220 Such insurance characterization is buttressed by the 
fact that the amount of insurance “purchased” seems to vary based on 
the riskiness of the position played.221 The Fantex transaction exhibits 
the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard common to 
insurance transactions—specifically, that (1) only risky football players 
would do the deal, and (2) the athletes might behave badly (e.g., by 
taking excessive risks on the field, accepting less pay, or quitting) 
because they feel protected against risk. 
Other ISAs may also approximate insurance. Students and 
entrepreneurs may, for example, use ISAs to protect themselves against 
the risk of career failure, the risk that a decision to pursue education 
does not reap the expected returns, or the risk that a bankruptcy filing 
will result in a nondischargeable student loan debt.222 Moral hazard 
and adverse selection issues will also be present in these contexts. 
Framing these arrangements as insurance may cast them in a 
more positive light than analogizing them to equity. However, the 
insurance analogy also has limits. Depending on the transaction’s 
 219.  See generally Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 29, 34, 42–45 (2012) (discussing the informational concerns and moral hazards).  
 220.  See supra note 142. The transaction does contain a claw-back provision. See, e.g., Fantex, 
Inc., supra note 1, at 165. 
 221.  For example, among the initial deals pursued by Fantex was an offering on Arian Foster, 
a Houston Texans running back. Foster opted to monetize twenty percent of his future earnings. 
See Erik Matuszewski, Fantex Postpones Arian Foster Share Sale Because of Back Surgery (Nov. 
13, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-12/fantex-postpones-arian-foster-
share-sale-because-of-back-surgery, archived at http://perma.cc/2ZG7-MPRJ. In contrast, Vernon 
Davis, a San Francisco 49ers tight end, opted to monetize only ten percent. Explore Stocks, supra 
note 22. According to NFL-based statistics, the running back position is physically more risky than 
that of tight end. Matt Stiles, Charting NFL Injuries, THE DAILY VIZ (March 17, 2013), 
http://thedailyviz.com/2013/03/17/charting-nfl-injuries/, archived at http://perma.cc/V6J4-KH3A. 
Foster’s offering was ultimately suspended due to back surgery. See Matuszewski, supra. Although 
riskiness of player position may have been an initial factor in selecting monetization rates, the 
current offerings (covering players in several different positions) are all at ten percent, with the 
exception of wide receiver Alshon Jeffery at thirteen percent. See Explore Stocks, supra note 22. 
 222.  Students may be managing risk by entering into these agreements in order to convert 
nondischargeable student loan debt into a debt that is dischargeable in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8)(A) (2012) (excepting student loans from discharge provisions). 
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economics, it is possible that risk transfer has not actually occurred.223 
Also, the consumption-smoothing aspect of insurance arguably is more 
questionable with ISAs because the insurance payout comes up front, 
before the risks being insured against have materialized.224 Perhaps 
most importantly, while ISAs may change the allocation of risks, 
current ISA structures do not generally pool risk.225 For example, risk 
is being transferred to the purchasers of Fantex shares, but such 
shareholders may not be diversifying their risks by investing in many 
athletes.226 
However, there is nothing to stop investors from pooling risk, for 
example, by purchasing other types of investments. Furthermore, to the 
extent that funding is not sought to develop a commercial enterprise 
but rather to smooth shocks, the arrangement may be credibly 
described as insurance-like. 
Thus, whether the insurance analogy is apt will depend on the 
economics—particularly the risk diversification and pooling features—
of the specific transaction. If an ISA can be fairly characterized as 
insurance, this may suggest a certain set of regulatory consequences, 
such as being subject to the jurisdiction of insurance regulators. 
b. Sale of an Income-Generating Asset or Income Stream 
ISAs may also be likened to a sale of an income-generating asset 
or rights to future income, such as an account receivable, an intangible, 
or some other type of future income stream. An individual might do this 
to accelerate cash receipts. For example, a funding seeker who is 
reasonably certain he will receive $50,000 a year of royalties for the 
next two years but who needs immediate payment might be able to 
accelerate that income stream at a suitable discount rate in exchange 
for a current lump sum.227 The analogy to sales of a receivable or right 
to future income may be most apt when the time period for income 
sharing is not very long or where the source and amount of the 
repayments is quite certain. 
If an ISA were analogized to such a sale or an assignment of 
income, then the regulatory consequences might differ from that 
accorded to an equity-like or debt-like arrangement. For example, the 
 223.  For example, insurance may simply not have occurred to the funding recipients. 
 224.  In Fantex, the athletes receive their funds upfront and regardless of actual injury or 
sports or commercial success. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 225.  See WILLETT, supra note 215, at 72. 
 226.  See supra Part II.A.1.  
 227.  This is essentially the nature of the Bowie Bond transaction. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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asset sold might escape inclusion in a bankruptcy estate.228 The tax 
consequences of a sale would also be different from that accorded an 
equity or debt issuance.229 
c. Gift, Donation, and Subsidy 
Finally, while some ISAs are designed to ensure that investors 
earn a certain return, others may be designed with a less profit-oriented 
motivation. For example, transactions offered by nonprofits or the 
government may be designed with the understanding that the funding 
provider may not necessarily recover its full investment or may recover 
no more than its principal.230 Such transactions may look less like 
equity or a sale and more like a gift, subsidy, or charitable donation. 
Particularly with respect to government-backed arrangements but also 
potentially with some nonprofit transactions, ISAs may be a form of 
social redistribution. It is likely that we will regard transactions that 
look like gifts, donations, or subsidies differently from those in which 
investors earn a profit, both in terms of normative evaluation and legal 
treatment. 
 
*       *       * 
 
The challenge confronting us is how to determine our normative 
attitudes and regulatory approach towards ISAs. In Part III, we argued 
that the work of comparison and analogy can help accomplish both 
tasks. First, comparing and analogizing ISAs to more familiar 
arrangements can serve as a heuristic for normative evaluation. 
Second, the predominant characteristics of a given ISA and its 
comparability to familiar regulatory categories should suggest the 
appropriate approach to its regulation.231 In general, an ISA should be 
regulated similarly to the existing category to which it is most 
analogous, unless there is a good reason to deviate. This allows 
economically similar transactions, particularly those that are close 
 228.  See, e.g., Thomas J. Gordon, Securitization of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy-
Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000) (describing how to keep a securitized asset 
out of a bankruptcy estate by structuring it as a true sale). 
 229.  Compare I.R.C. § 1001 (2012) (defining gain and loss for sales), and § 1221 (defining 
capital assets to exclude stock in trade of the taxpayer), with § 351 (recognizing no gain or loss if 
property is transferred in exchange for stock). For example, such a sale might implicate the 
assignment of income doctrine. 
 230.  This is arguably the case with 13th Avenue Funding and Lumni’s nonprofit funds. See 
supra Parts II.A.4.a and II.A.4.b. 
 231.  See supra Part III.B and C. 
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substitutes, to be treated similarly.232 Conversely, a wholesale approach 
that groups all ISAs together and regulates them in a monolithic 
fashion is likely to be overinclusive, underinclusive, or poorly tailored. 
IV. A MULTIFACTOR FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION 
How might regulators determine the categories to which ISAs 
are most analogous? Part IV articulates a multifactor framework that 
may be employed across a number of regulatory fields in making this 
determination. Multifactor tests are a well-established regulatory tool 
in a number of fields. A multifactor analysis may be applied in cases 
where regulators are seeking to determine how a new transaction 
should be categorized and labeled for purposes of regulating the 
activity. In particular, this method can play an important role where 
transactions or contractual arrangements have features of more than 
one analytical or regulatory category.233 A multifactor analysis tailored 
to address the distinctive issues raised by these transactions is a 
particularly appropriate mode of analysis in the case of ISAs because it 
is sensitive to the heterogeneity of ISAs and the various regulatory 
fields that may potentially govern them. 
A. Should a Transaction Be Treated as Debt? 
The first step is to determine whether a seemingly new 
transaction is actually new or whether it is simply a type of contingent 
debt. It makes sense to ask this threshold question because debt is a 
familiar regulatory construct with respect to the financing of 
individuals. The question is whether an ISA has enough in common 
with debt that it can fit snugly in the debt “box” and be regulated 
accordingly. 
Weighing a list of factors can help make this determination. In 
the ISA context, the following factors would suggest that an 
arrangement is similar enough to debt that we should strongly consider 
regulating it as such. It is important to reiterate that there is no 
expectation that precisely the same list of factors would be applied in 
all regulatory fields to test the ISA’s similarity to debt. However, given 
 232.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 233.  For example, a multifactor analysis is used to distinguish debt from equity in the tax and 
bankruptcy contexts. E.g., Indmar Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 444 F.3d 771, 776–77 (6th Cir. 2006); Fin 
Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968) (citing J.S. Biritz Constr. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 387 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1967)); Idaho Dev., LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, 272 P.3d 
373, 377–78 (Idaho 2011). The list of factors differs among courts, and courts have generally 
recognized that no single factor is determinative.  
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that debt instruments have certain core features irrespective of the 
regulatory field doing the analysis, we anticipate that the following 
factors would be relevant in multiple fields: 
 
Intent of the parties. The parties’ intent, as manifested 
by objective factors such as the funding provider’s 
expectation of repayment, the instrument label, the 
financial viability of the funding recipient, and the 
recipient’s likely ability to repay principal plus interest, 
should be considered. 
 
Form of the instrument. For example, the existence of a 
fixed term, an unconditional promise to pay, and 
remedies upon default would indicate a debt instrument. 
 
Whether the interest rate is fixed. A fixed interest rate 
would tend to indicate debt. 
 
Duration of the instrument and existence of a fixed 
maturity date. A fixed maturity date is indicative of debt, 
and a longer duration is indicative of equity because the 
holder takes on more risk over a longer time period. 
 
Extent of subordination to claims of creditors. 
Subordination to other debts in repayment priority 
indicates an equity interest. 
 
Allocation of the risk between parties. To the extent the 
funding provider is insulated against the risk of low 
earnings or loss of principal—for example, by virtue of 
minimum payments, earnings floors, or term deferrals—
the agreement looks more like debt, in which repayment 
of principal is required.234 
 
Participation in management. A greater degree of 
participation in management suggests an equity or 
ownership investment, rather than a mere creditor 
interest. 
 234.  See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“[T]he Dutch banks’ interest was overwhelmingly in the nature of a secured lender’s 
interest, which would neither be harmed by poor performance of the partnership nor significantly 
enhanced by extraordinary profits. The banks had no meaningful stake in the success or failure of 
Castle Harbour.”). 
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If a weighing of these and other relevant factors by a regulatory regime 
suggests that a given ISA sufficiently resembles debt to be treated as 
such, then the existing legal framework in that field for regulating debt 
can be applied to the ISA. 
This is not to say that ISAs may not raise fresh challenges or 
that our current approach to the regulation of debt is optimal. We make 
no claim that existing legal treatment of debt in bankruptcy, tax, 
consumer protection, bank regulation, or other areas is ideal, rational, 
or sufficient. In particular, the adequacy of current approaches to the 
regulation of consumer debt has been subject to scrutiny.235 Our more 
basic point is that if ISAs can be subsumed under the rubric of debt, 
then these questions can be addressed under the general umbrella of 
lending regulation and reform. New categories need not be created. 
Thus, for example, an ISA ultimately characterized as debt by a state 
based on an analysis of factors would typically face that state’s usury 
law limitations on the interest rate and terms permitted. A debt 
designation also more clearly suggests a role for the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau in the regulation of these new agreements. 
B. Is it Too Much Like Human Ownership? 
If the ISA is not debt, then it could either fall within the equity-
like gray zone or, alternatively, could come too close to human 
ownership. Thus, we should next examine the possibility that it creates 
a problematic ownership or property-like interest in a human that 
ought to be restricted, in order to eliminate that possibility. The 
presence of four factors in particular would strongly suggest that a 
contract too closely approximates human ownership: 
 
Excessive duration of the contract. A contract that called 
for payments over a longer period of time would suggest 
human ownership more than one lasting, say, five years. 
 
Too large a percentage of income encumbered. A contract 
sharing a large percentage of income would look more 
like ownership than one sharing a small percentage. 
 235.  Questions regarding financial product regulation have arisen in the context of 
articulating the mission of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. See generally Bar-Gill & 
Warren, supra note 15; Richard Cordray, Protecting Consumers in the Financial Marketplace: 
Keynote Address, November 2, 2012, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1; Daniel Carpenter & Patricia A. 
McCoy, Keeping Tabs on Financial Innovation: Product Identifiers in Consumer Financial 
Regulation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 195 (2013). 
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Too much control over funding recipient’s labor, 
investment, and personal choices. The more control 
exercised by the investor, whether formally or through 
informal mechanisms and networks, the more an 
agreement might look like servitude or ownership. 
 
Too broad a base for income sharing. An agreement that 
shares income from a specific business activity, 
investment, or job intrudes less on a recipient’s self-
determination than one that shares a percentage of all 
the individual’s income. 
 
For example, based on these factors, a contract that encumbers eighty 
percent of the funding recipient’s income over thirty years and in which 
the funding provider has the power to direct the recipient’s career 
choices (such as a provision that the recipient must work in the 
financial services industry for X years) would too closely approximate 
servitude or slavery. Depending on the specific context, an ISA need not 
have all four factors to trigger policy concerns and potential 
invalidation. Ultimately, the analogy between an ISA and an 
impermissible slavery/servitude arrangement will be a function of 
weighing the four factors and determining how they infringe upon the 
funding recipient. A finding that an ISA strongly resembles human 
ownership might suggest that that we should put in place regulatory 
structures that ban or circumscribe such ISA variants. 
C. Regulating in the Equity-Like Gray Zone 
If an ISA is not sufficiently analogous to traditional debt from 
the perspective of a particular regulatory field to warrant the debt label, 
but the ISA also does not rise to the level of human ownership or 
indentured servitude to warrant serious government intervention, then 
it must fall in the messy gray area of financial instruments that have 
some equity-like features. As discussed in Part III.C, possible analogies 
include corporate equity (either in the whole person or in a 
circumscribed venture), partnership or joint venture (again either in 
the person or in a venture), insurance, income assignments, gifts, or 
subsidies.236 The regulatory question is what legal rules should apply 
to ISAs falling within this messy gray zone, with respect to protection 
and treatment of both investors and funding seekers. The task is 
 236.  See discussion supra Part III.C; see also supra note 214. 
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complicated by the fact that there may be significant differences among 
ISAs, and these differences may demand different regulatory 
approaches. 
We suggest that the following factors might be considered in 
determining where exactly in the gray zone a given ISA falls and, thus, 
what rules should apply. As before, there is no expectation that each 
regulatory field will use precisely the same set of factors to make this 
determination. Additional factors may be relevant in a specific field. 
However, given that these regulatory fields generally confront a 
common array of financial arrangements, we anticipate that the 
following factors would be relevant across most regulatory fields in 
evaluating “gray zone” transactions. None of the proposed factors below 
would be determinative, and the regulator’s ultimate conclusion will 
depend on the totality of the circumstances, determined by weighing 
the relevant factors. 
 
Interposition of a Corporate Entity. First, it is relevant 
whether a corporate or other entity has been interposed 
between the funding provider and the funding recipient. 
This can help distinguish, analytically speaking, between 
whether a corporate equity interest or a partnership/joint 
venture interest has been created. The existence of an 
intermediate entity (such as that interposed in the 
Upstart transaction) is more likely to suggest corporate 
equity. 
 
Base for Sharing Income. As was the case in testing for 
servitude or slavery, the income sharing base must 
continue to be considered. If the income sharing base is 
the funding recipient’s total income (Line 22), the 
arrangement may look more like a minority corporate- or 
partnership-like equity stake in an individual herself, 
rather than in a circumscribed venture undertaken by 
that individual. If, alternatively, the income sharing base 
is only income from a circumscribed set of activities (e.g., 
a discrete business), then the transaction may more 
closely approximate an equity-like interest in a 
circumscribed venture or a sale of that income stream. 
While this factor does not help distinguish between 
corporate and partnership/joint venture equity, it can 
help differentiate between equity in a venture and equity 
in a person and may also suggest a sale of an income-
producing asset. 
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Funding Provider’s Expected Return on the Investment. 
The degree to which the funding provider expects to earn 
a return on her investment must also be considered. 
Some ISAs are based on economic models that attempt to 
ensure a certain rate of return. However, an agreement 
could also be structured so that the funding provider does 
not earn a profit (e.g., federal income-contingent student 
loan repayment programs or nonprofits like Lumni and 
13th Avenue).237 Transactions structured so that the 
funding provider does not make a profit may suggest an 
element of gift, charitable donation, or subsidy rather 
than equity ownership. Transactions in which the return 
is essentially fixed may indicate a sale of an income-
producing asset. The following are some factors that 
might reveal the expected return on an investment: the 
extent of the recipient’s other borrowing, the amount 
funded as compared to the repayment terms, the 
estimated future earning potential of the recipient, and 
the fund or startup’s investment return history. 
 
Funding Provider’s Intent. It is also important to 
consider the funding provider’s intent as manifested by 
objective factors. This can help distinguish equity-like 
investments from arrangements with donative 
motivations. For example, if the terms of the agreement 
show that the funding provider’s intention is to make a 
substantial profit, this would detract from gift or subsidy 
characterization, even if no profit is ultimately made. On 
the other hand, if the formal and informal terms indicate 
that mentoring between the funding investor and 
recipient is the primary motivation, this may suggest 
more strongly a gift or donation, despite an eventual 
profit. For example, 13th Avenue Funding’s nonprofit 
model is reminiscent of informal arrangements in which 
a community pools resources to send its promising youth 
to school. Thus, it might seem inappropriate to 
characterize 13th Avenue as equity and to regulate it in 
a manner identical to a transaction like Upstart. 
 
 237.  See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing Lumni, 13th Avenue, and government 
transactions). 
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Identity of the Funding Provider. The identity of the 
funding provider must also be considered. From a 
commercial and regulatory perspective, there may be 
important differences between government-based and 
not-for-profit financing arrangements and those arising 
in the private sector. Private-sector transactions are 
generally expected to provide a market return to 
investors and may look more like equity.238 This may be 
less so with nonprofit, low-profit, or government models, 
where a significant gift, subsidy, or redistribution 
element may dominate. It is more difficult to characterize 
such agreements as equity, and it is correspondingly 
unlikely that a unified regulatory scheme could 
effectively govern all of the possible types of players in 
this growing sector. 
 
Funding Recipient’s Application of the Funds. Another 
factor is how the funding recipient applies the funds. To 
the extent the funds are used for risk management rather 
than to fund a business venture, pay education costs, or 
otherwise generate income for the recipient, the 
investment may be less like a partnership or corporate 
equity-like interest and more like insurance and risk 
diversification. 
 
Whether Human Capital is Appreciating or Depreciating. 
Whether the recipient’s human capital is appreciating or 
depreciating may influence the choice between insurance 
and equity characterization. For example, in the 
education context, the funding recipient’s human capital 
is presumably appreciating. In contrast, in the 
professional football context, the player’s human capital 
is arguably depreciating or at risk. Contexts in which 
human capital is depreciating may suggest an insurance 
or earnings-smoothing arrangement more than an 
equity-like arrangement, particularly if the funding 
recipient is not using the funds to advance his income-
earning potential or business venture but to guard 
against risk. 
 
 238.  Thus, these new transactions do not necessarily make college cheap. 
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Whether Risk is Being Pooled. The existence of risk 
pooling would strongly suggest insurance.239 Existing 
ISAs have not generally created a pool for diversifying 
against risk. One might argue that risk is effectively 
being spread among the multiple funding providers, but 
this structure is different from traditional insurance. An 
indication that there is pooling of risk would buttress a 
true insurance characterization. 
 
Whether the return is dependent on a specified asset 
expected to generate a certain return. Finally, we must 
consider whether the return to the investor is generated 
from a specified asset and whether that return is 
relatively certain. If so, the arrangement may more 
closely approximate a sale of an income-producing asset 
rather than equity or something else. 
 
*       *       * 
 
The foregoing are some of the main factors that should be 
considered by regulators in bankruptcy, tax, securities, and other fields 
in determining where in the equity-like gray zone a given transaction 
falls. As indicated, our list is not necessarily exhaustive, and other 
factors may also be useful. Furthermore, the factors analysis we have 
put forth is necessarily generic and essentially constitutes a generalized 
prototype approach that may be modified and adjusted by each 
regulatory field. Ultimately, these factors would need to be weighed 
against each other to determine the true nature of the ISA based on the 
totality of the circumstances. 
Ultimately, the exercise of comparison and analogy through 
multifactor analysis can serve as an evaluative heuristic in considering 
the normative aspects of each particular ISA. It also can suggest the 
likely best approach to that ISA’s regulation. 
V. APPLYING OUR MULTIFACTOR FRAMEWORK 
This Article has argued that ISAs are sufficiently novel that they 
merit scrutiny by regulators but are heterogeneous enough that a 
unified regulatory approach is problematic. As such, this Article has 
advocated regulation by analogy for ISAs using a multifactor analysis. 
Although the precise set of factors examined by each regulatory field in 
 239.  See supra Part III.C; see also supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
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performing this inquiry would likely be adjusted for the specific needs 
of the field, we expect that certain core factors will be relevant across 
most regulatory areas. 
Part V illustrates the application of our proposed multifactor 
analysis. Parts V.A and V.B apply our multifactor analysis to the Pave 
ISA transaction,240 concluding that while the analogy is not perfect, 
Pave may look enough like a partnership that we should look to 
partnership concepts in designing its legal and regulatory treatment 
unless important policy considerations suggest otherwise.241 Part V.C 
examines the Rubio-Petri proposed legislation as an illustration of the 
perils of a unified approach to ISAs. 
A. Applying the Analysis to Pave 
Applying the multifactor analysis to Pave, we first ask whether 
Pave looks sufficiently like debt to fit into that familiar regulatory 
category. As noted, each regulatory field would make that 
determination itself. However, a core cluster of factors (which we 
identified in Part IV and apply here) would likely be broadly relevant. 
We then examine the other extreme—the possibility that Pave could 
look enough like servitude or slavery to justify restriction. Concluding 
that Pave is clearly distinct from debt and does not amount to servitude, 
we examine where in the gray zone Pave falls. 
1. Is Pave Analogous to Traditional Debt? 
Testing the Pave transaction using the factors outlined in Part 
IV.A, it would be hard to characterize Pave as debt. Of the seven factors, 
four clearly suggest that the transaction is not debt, and two are neutral 
or lean slightly away from debt characterization. Only one potentially 
suggests debt characterization. 
The parties’ intentions and the label, given the transactions, the 
form of the instrument, the lack of a fixed interest rate, and the 
allocation of risk, suggest that the transaction is not debt: 
 
240.  As noted, it is unclear whether Pave’s ISA has been replaced by a new loan product as of 
August 2014. See discussion supra note 39. However, the Pave ISA still merits analysis as a 
leading example of the new wave of ISAs. Moreover, Pave ISAs that were entered into prior to 
August 2014 still exist and continue to raise tax and other regulatory questions. 
 241.  Our discussion is based on information that has been made available on the Pave 
website. See, e.g., Common Questions, PAVE, https://web.archive.org/web/20121216014602/http:// 
pave.com/questions, archived at http://perma.cc/79UX-T5S4. The actual Income Linked Payment 
Agreement is not publicly available.  
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Parties’ intentions/transaction label. Pave’s website 
draws distinctions between Pave’s structure and debt 
with respect to repayment terms and the lender’s ability 
to share upside.242 Pave has also stated that its 
“participation agreement is like a partnership, with 
interests fully aligned for both parties.”243 
 
Form of the instrument. The absence of an unconditional 
promise to pay signals that Pave is not debt. 
 
Interest rate/interest payments. Pave’s Income-Linked 
Payment Agreement does not provide for a fixed interest 
rate or for payment of interest. The funding recipient 
pays a specified percentage of her total income annually, 
as calculated on Line 22 of Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) Form 1040.244 This suggests that Pave’s structure 
is distinguishable from debt. 
 
Risk allocation. Pave’s investors bear the risk that 
recipients will not succeed financially. Recipients may be 
excused from payment entirely in years when their 
income falls below 150 percent of the poverty line.245 
Thus, there is no guaranteed minimum return. On the 
other hand, if the recipient is successful, the investor can 
receive returns that exceed the rate of return on debt.246 
These terms indicate equity. 
 
Two of the remaining three factors either lean slightly away 
from debt or are neutral: 
 
Priority relative to other claimants/subordination. The 
income sharing base is IRS Form 1040 Line 22 income, 
 242.  Id.  
 243.  Id.  
 244.  What Counts as Income when Calculating How Much I Must Share with My Backers, 
PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200407688--What-counts-as-income-when-
calculating-how-much-I-must-share-with-my-Backers- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). If 
recipient files a joint return, the spouse’s income is deducted from the Line 22 income. Id. 
 245.  This hardship exemption will not extend the agreement term. Is There Ever a Time 
During the Participation Period When I Wouldn’t Need to Share Income?, supra note 45.  
 246.  The recipient can terminate the agreement early by repaying five times the amount 
funded. Common Questions, supra note 241. This is higher than the three times the amount of 
income cap in the Upstart transaction. See UPSTART FUNDING AGREEMENT, supra note 28 and 
accompanying text. 
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which includes business net income. Business net income 
in turn takes into account business expenses (including 
allowable business interest) reported on Schedule C. 
Thus, the funding recipient will first pay business 
interest and expenses before “sharing” income with the 
investor. Such subordination of the repayment obligation 
to the payment of business expenses allows the funding 
recipient a large degree of discretion and may suggest 
equity characterization. On the other hand, the 
repayment obligation is not subordinated to payment of 
personal interest, so subordination is at best partial. 
 
Duration and fixed maturity date. The Pave agreement 
term cannot exceed ten years.247 This time frame is 
compatible with either equity or debt characterization. 
Furthermore, while the agreement has a fixed ten-year 
term, there is no requirement that the investors actually 
recover their investment within that time frame. Thus, 
this factor is neutral at best. 
 
Finally, “participation in management” is the only factor that 
might signal debt rather than equity. Greater degrees of management 
participation suggest an equity interest. Although mentoring is a 
component of the Pave relationship, it does not appear to rise to the 
level of true management control, at least on paper.248 On the other 
hand, it is possible that such mentoring may be robust in practice. 
In sum, it would be difficult to characterize Pave as debt.249 Not 
only do a greater number of factors suggest “not debt” characterization; 
the purpose of the transaction also indicates that it is likely not debt 
because there is not really an expectation of repayment regardless of 
whether the funding recipient succeeds.250 Stated differently, the Pave 
 247.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 248.  Common Questions, supra note 241:  
Another major difference is that a Pave agreement has an added value—backers. Many 
of them are eager to offer guidance, advice and connections in fields relevant to 
prospects’ interests. With all their experience, backers know that even one phone call 
or email introduction can make a huge difference to someone who is just starting out in 
an industry. Also, backer and prospect interests are aligned—the more successful 
prospects are, the more their backers share in that success. 
How It Works, supra note 170 (“Backers can choose to provide advice and support throughout the 
talent’s journey.”).  
 249.  We reached the same basic conclusion with respect to Upstart in prior work. See Oei & 
Ring, supra note 3, at 274–75. 
 250.  TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957)); see also Historic Boardwalk Hall, 
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investors have a “meaningful stake in the success or failure of the 
[venture].”251 Thus, not only do the individual factors point away from 
debt, but it is also clear that the core purpose of Pave is one of explicitly 
sharing in the successes and failures of funding recipients, an 
ownership or equity-like idea. 
2. Does Pave Raise Human Ownership or Servitude Concerns? 
Having determined that Pave cannot be conveniently slotted 
into the regulatory category of debt, the next question is whether it 
creates an unacceptable servitude or human ownership arrangement. 
As discussed in Part IV.B, the presence of four factors would 
strongly indicate that a contract closely approximates human 
ownership: excessive duration of the contract, a high percentage of 
income shared, a large degree of investor control, and a broad base for 
sharing income. Although Pave uses a broad income sharing base (Line 
22 of Form 1040), the contract is not unduly long (ten years),252 nor is 
the percentage of income shared unduly high (ten percent).253 Further, 
the investors do not exercise excessive control over funding recipients. 
Thus, Pave does not rise to the level of human ownership or servitude 
that ought to be banned.254 
3. What Kind of Interest Has Been Conveyed by Pave? 
Because Pave is not debt and does not cross the line into human 
ownership, it follows that the transaction must fall in the zone of equity-
like transactions. Therefore, we next ask what kind of equity-like 
interest it most resembles. Closely examining its underlying economics 
and applying the factors articulated in Part IV.C, we suggest that Pave 
may be best analogized to a type of partnership between funding 
providers and recipients in which the funding providers take a 
partnership interest in the Talent’s human capital. 
LLC v. Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425, 450 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining the court’s analysis in Castle Harbour, 
459 F.3d at 224); Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 232  (a “significant factor” in debt-equity 
determinations is “whether the funds were advanced with reasonable expectations of repayment 
regardless of the success of the venture.”). 
 251.  Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 224. 
 252.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. One could argue that the duration of the ISA 
term should be compared against Talent’s life or career expectancy in order to more accurately 
measure excessive duration. On the other hand, a ten-year term is not notably longer (and in some 
cases may be substantially shorter) than the repayment period for some traditional loan products.  
 253.  Id. 
 254.  See Oei & Ring, supra note 3, at 275 (reaching comparable conclusion regarding Upstart). 
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Yet the analogy is not exact. If it were exact, there would not 
have been any regulatory uncertainty. It is important in pursuing 
regulation by analogy to appreciate that the “conclusion” the method 
offers is not that an ISA is, for example, a partnership but rather that 
the partnership category might be the closest existing regulatory 
category. Critiques of regulation by analogy grounded in the argument 
that an ISA such as a Pave is not a partnership under general 
partnership principles, or tax or bankruptcy law, misconceive the 
problem and the solution offered by this Article. Pave is distinct from a 
traditional partnership because it creates a partnership interest in all 
of a person’s human capital over a set time period rather than in a 
circumscribed but potentially indefinite venture. That said, the appeal 
to Pave’s investors is typically made on the basis of a proposal of a 
circumscribed business venture or educational plan. 
On balance, evaluation of the following factors suggests the 
creation of a partnership-like arrangement: 
 
Interposition of a corporate entity (distinguishing 
partnership equity from corporate equity). Pave is a peer-
to-peer arrangement.255 No intermediate entities have 
been interposed. This is indicative of a partnership 
rather than a corporate arrangement. 
 
Base for sharing (distinguishing investment in a person 
v. investment in a circumscribed activity, project, or 
venture). Pave claims that “[t]he Pave agreement allows 
backers to invest directly in an individual, not a project 
or company.”256 The website notes that “the investment 
is in whatever work the Talent chooses to pursue” and 
that “[o]ne failed project doesn’t mean a total loss for the 
Backer, since the Talent will go on to do something 
different.”257 Pave claims that “Backers are allies who 
share in either the failures or achievements of their 
Talent.”258 Such alignment of interests and intent to ally, 
with the goal of maximizing profits or success, suggest a 
 255.  See Tell Me More About Pave’s Income-Linked Payment Agreement (IPA), supra note 43 
(describing Pave as a “truly peer-to-peer agreement that is legally enforceable”). 
 256.  PAVE, supra note 152. 
 257.  How Is Pave Different from Other Crowdfunding Platforms or Financing Alternatives?, 
PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200398018-How-is-Pave-different-from-other-
crowdfunding-platforms-or-financing-alternatives- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). 
 258.  Id.  
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partnership.259 Pave itself claims that the Pave 
agreement is “like a partnership.”260 
 
Funders’ expected return (distinguishing equity from 
donative arrangement). Pave explicitly highlights the 
funders’ expected return, which they calculate to provide 
Backers “with an expected return . . . of 7%.”261 Pave also 
notes its proprietary funding model developed “by our 
own expert Data Scientist in collaboration with Yale 
University’s nationally renowned Labor Economist,” 
which incorporates a wide range of variables.262 
 
Investor intent (distinguishing equity from donative 
arrangement). Pave seeks to market a compelling 
investment opportunity to investors with a targeted rate 
of return.263 This is not a donative arrangement but is 
more clearly equity. 
 
Identity of the funding providers (distinguishing equity 
from donative arrangement). Pave is organized by a 
private, for-profit entity rather than a nonprofit or 
government entity. The investors it seeks to attract are 
“experienced, successful professionals” looking for a 
“direct-investing platform.”264 These factors suggest 
equity rather than a donation or subsidy. 
 
Use of the funds—growth v. protection (distinguishing 
insurance-like structure from equity). Rather than 
protect against economic shocks, funding recipients use 
the funds for education or entrepreneurship.265 Pave 
emphasizes the “shared venture” nature of its 
 259.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 260.  Will I Be Able to Exit the Pave IPA Early?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-
us/articles/200478356-Will-I-be-able-to-exit-the-Pave-IPA-early-(May 19, 2014) (on file with 
authors). 
 261.  What are the Expected Financial Returns?, supra note 48.  
 262.  PAVE, Our Model, http://www.pave.com/funding-model, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
M2M2-EM5K (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 263.  Id; What are the Expected Financial Returns?, supra note 48. 
 264.  What Is Pave?, PAVE, http://support.pave.com/hc/en-us/articles/200597693-What-is-
Pave- (May 19, 2014) (on file with authors). 
 265.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
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arrangement.266 This indicates that the structure is one 
of investment, not insurance. 
 
Whether human capital is increasing or decreasing 
(distinguishing insurance from equity). Pave 
characterizes itself as a “platform for networking 
experienced, successful professionals with . . . rising, 
talented individuals.”267 Human capital is most likely 
appreciating, suggesting equity. 
 
Whether risk is being pooled (distinguishing insurance 
from equity). There is no indication of risk pooling in the 
traditional insurance sense.268 This suggests that the 
arrangement is not insurance. 
 
Whether return is dependent on a specified asset 
expected to generate a certain return (distinguishing 
sales of income streams from equity arrangements). The 
return earned by the investors is a percentage of all the 
annual income (Line 22, Form 1040) generated by the 
recipient during the contract years. Neither the amount 
nor the source is certain at the time of contract. Investors 
are fully at risk with the funding recipient’s financial 
success. Thus, Pave is not a sale of a fixed income stream. 
 
Thus, application of these core factors suggests that, on balance, 
Pave resembles an equity-like arrangement rather than insurance, gift, 
subsidy, or something else. As between corporate and partnership 
equity, the better analogy is to a partnership-like arrangement because 
Pave is peer-to-peer. With regard to the type of partnership, the Pave 
structure more closely resembles an investment in the person and not 
the project. Again, while we do not claim that the partnership analogy 
is exact,269 the likenesses suggest that Pave should be treated similarly 
to partnerships for legal and regulatory purposes, unless there is a good 
reason to deviate (as determined under each particular regulatory 
regime). 
 266.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 267.  What Is Pave?, supra note 264. 
 268.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 269.  We could imagine, for example, that depending on certain facts, the transaction may look 
more like the sale of an income stream, which would invite its own distinctive legal treatment. 
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It might at first blush appear ludicrous to suggest that Pave is 
most analogous to a partnership. However, despite arguably “light” 
control of funding recipients, Pave is not unlike some services-partner 
arrangements. For example, Pave is not so different from the case 
where two people decide to partner in opening a vegetable-selling stand, 
one providing capital and the other labor. One might argue that this 
arrangement might bear stronger resemblance to an employer-
employee relationship or some alternative economic arrangements; 
however, at least some of these types of arrangements have been held 
to be partnerships. Moreover, the Pave investors’ interests may be 
similar to those of some limited partners, who may not have much 
direction over the enterprise. Additionally, the Pave relationship may 
have some elements of joint control, which would more clearly indicate 
a partnership or joint venture.270 Pave promotes and identifies the 
Talent’s Backers as the “Team,”271 and Talent is required to submit a 
funding proposal to obtain the funds.272 Having determined that Pave 
is clearly not debt using the primary factors likely determinative of debt 
status, it is not that surprising that the closest analogy might be 
partnership equity. 
B. Legal and Regulatory Upshot of the Multifactor Analysis 
Assuming that regulators in various fields conclude that Pave 
most resembles a partnership-like arrangement, what legal and 
regulatory consequences might follow? While, as noted, the partnership 
analogy may not be precise, and while the legal and regulatory 
treatment of “regular” partnerships cannot be interposed without 
modification on the new ISAs, some insights are possible. An in-depth 
treatment of all possible legal and regulatory ramifications of the 
partnership analogy is beyond the scope of this Article. The following 
discussion very briefly surveys some key takeaways. 
1. Taxation 
The tax treatment of ISAs must be addressed because taxpayers 
must make tax computation and return filing decisions annually, 
regardless of actual tax liability. If an ISA is taxed as a partnership 
rather than debt, key tax differences will result regarding timing, 
 270.  See supra note 248 and accompanying text.  
 271.  See What We Do, PAVE https://web.archive.org/web/20130328170616/http:// 
www.pave.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/9JJQ-5V8P (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 272. Id. 
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location of income inclusion, recovery of investment (i.e., tax basis), and 
deductibility of costs (e.g., interest). 
It is not inconceivable that the IRS could treat Pave as a 
partnership for tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Code has defined a 
partnership to include a “syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other 
unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any 
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on.”273 Treasury 
regulations provide that “[a] joint venture or other contractual 
arrangement may create a separate entity [i.e., a partnership] for 
federal tax purposes if the participants carry on a trade, business, 
financial operation, or venture and divide the profits therefrom.”274 In 
addition, cases and IRS rulings contain precedent for recharacterizing 
lending and other economic relationships as partnerships.275 It is well 
known that debt-equity analysis applies in the partnership tax context 
to distinguish partnership equity from debtor-creditor relationships.276 
Even arrangements that have some features of debt (such as a very 
certain return) have been treated as equity for tax purposes.277 
If Pave were taxed according to partnership principles, the 
following key results might follow: First, the Pave “partnership” would 
be required to keep book and tax capital accounts, track basis 
adjustments at the partnership level, and file a partnership-level 
information return.278 Second, even though taxable income would be 
computed at the partnership level,279 each partner would have to 
include for tax purposes her distributive share of partnership income in 
her gross income, regardless of whether she has actually received any 
 273.  I.R.C. §§761(a), 7701(a)(2) (2012). 
 274.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (2014); see also Comm’r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 
(1949) (holding that a partnership exists when two or more “parties in good faith and acting with 
a business purpose intend[ ] to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise”). 
 275.  Rev. Rul. 90-27, 1990-1 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 111; Hartman v. Comm’r, 
17 T.C.M (CCH) 1020 (1958). 
 276.  WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, § 
3.05[3] (4th ed. 2015) (“[T]he confusing morass of debt-equity cases that exist in the corporate 
context must be parsed in order to ascertain whether a particular relationship creates a 
partnership or merely a debtor-creditor relationship.”); I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357; see 
also TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(detailing factors to analyze “in determining whether an interest is “more akin to debt or equity”). 
 277.  MCKEE § 3.05[3] (noting that “Congress and the Treasury have been willing to accept as 
equity many instruments that have nearly all of the enumerated qualities of debt” and that “while 
labeling may seem merely semantic, the words used have legal rights and obligations that attach 
to them and may ensure the result they represent”). 
 278.  I.R.C. §§ 701, 703(a). 
 279.  Given that Pave anticipates that Talent will file an individual Form 1040 providing the 
basis for the income sharing, it is unclear how the tax system’s requirement that a partnership 
return be filed instead would impact the implementation of Pave’s ISA. 
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partnership distributions.280 While the distributive share is typically 
determined by the partnership agreement, where there is no 
agreement, it will be determined in accordance with the partner’s 
interest in the partnership.281 Third, partnership characterization 
would require tracking of each partner’s basis in the partnership 
(“outside basis”). Generally speaking, outside basis is increased by a 
partner’s distributive share of taxable income and decreased by any 
distributions to the partner and her distributive share of partnership 
losses.282 Partnership treatment suggests that investors would not be 
permitted full recovery of their entire basis before having an income 
inclusion. 283 
The treatment outlined above differs from that which would 
result if Pave were, for example, treated as a debt or the sale of an 
income stream. It also differs from the tax treatment described in the 
Rubio-Petri Bill.284 Key differences include (1) whether the funding 
recipient would include all income earned on her individual Form 1040, 
(2) whether she would receive an interest deduction on that Form 1040, 
and (3) how investors would be taxed on income received from their 
investment.285 
 280.  I.R.C. § 702(c). 
 281.  I.R.C. § 704(a), (b). The distributive share will be computed in accordance with the 
partner’s interest in the partnership if the partnership’s allocations lack substantial economic 
effect. I.R.C. § 704(b). In computing partnership taxable income, certain deductions would be taken 
into account at the partner level on their separate tax returns and certain items would have to be 
separately stated. I.R.C. §§ 702(a)(1)–(7), 703(a). Also, a partner’s capital account would be reduced 
for any actual distribution made to the partner and increased by the partner’s distributive share 
of partnership income. I.R.C. § 705. See generally, WILLIAM LYONS & JAMES R. REPETTI, 
PARTNERSHIP INCOME TAXATION 44–60 (5th ed. 2011). 
  Treating Talent’s income as belonging to the partnership is not prohibited by assignment 
of income principles. See, e.g., Schneer v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 643, 663 (1991) (right to pool partnership 
earnings overrode assignment of income principles). Courts have even held that salaries earned 
by an individual partner can be attributable to the partnership if germane to the partnership’s 
business. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES, AND GIFTS § 75.2 (3d ed. 2015) (citing Bufalino v. Comm’r, 35 T.C.M (CCH) 494 (1976) 
(payments made to a partnership for services by one partner are includable in the income of the 
partnership rather than the partner); Rev. Rul. 80-338, 1980-2 C.B. 30 (executor fees for partner’s 
services taxable to partnership, because partnership performed similar services)). 
 282.  I.R.C. §§ 705, 722, 733. 
 283.  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704(a) (requiring a partner to include her distributive share of 
partnership income regardless of whether such income is actually distributed to her).  
 284.  H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. §§ 201, 301 (2014). 
 285.  For example, if Pave were treated like debt, Backers might include interest and 
determine income under something like the contingent bond method. 
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2. Securities Law 
The two central issues in securities law are whether an 
instrument or arrangement is a security (and thereby subject to 
antifraud provisions under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act), and if so, 
whether offers to sell the security must be registered with the SEC 
under the 1933 Act.286 
The 1933 Act defines the term “security” in part as “any note, 
stock, treasury stock, . . . bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing 
agreements, . . . [or] investment contract.”287 Given that stock is an 
enumerated instrument in the securities law definition of a security,288 
there is a strong presumption that stock is a security, and certainly 
corporate stock would be so treated.289 “Notes” are also an enumerated 
instrument that constitutes a security,290 with a corresponding 
presumption.291 However, securities case law has developed a test to 
determine when a given note should in fact be treated as a security and 
when it should not. Under the Supreme Court’s “family resemblance” 
test, notes are presumed to be securities unless they share family 
resemblance (using a four-factor test) to a judicially crafted list of 
transactions that are not considered securities.292 
 286.  See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 
2930—ENTREPRENEUR ACCESS TO CAPITAL ACT (Nov. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr2930r_20111102.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/X4KJ-URLB (“The President[ ] . . . called for cutting away the red tape 
that prevents many rapidly growing startup companies from raising needed capital, [and 
supported a securities regulation exemption from registration] for ‘crowdfunding.’ ”). 
 287.  Securities Act of 1933 §2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
 288.  Id.  
 289.  Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985). 
 290.  15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
 291.  See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64–66 (1990) (interpreting the language 
of the Securities Acts as creating the rebuttable presumption that every note is a security). 
 292.  Id. at 67; see 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(1). In its “family resemblance test,” the Court, citing 
Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1976) and 
Chemical Bank v., Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984) outlined four types of 
notes that would not be securities: (1) “the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured 
by a mortgage on a home,” (2) the “short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some 
of its assets,” (3) “the note evidencing a ‘character’ loan to a bank customer,” and (4) the “short-
term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an 
open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the 
customer of a broker, it is collateralized).” The Court further identified four basic themes that 
explained why certain notes should not be considered securities: (1) motivation (e.g., issuer seeking 
general funds v. funding for a small asset); (2) plan of distribution for the instrument; (3) 
reasonable expectations of the investing public; and (4) existence of other regulatory oversight that 
reduces the need for securities regulation. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65–67. 
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Finally, partnership interests, though not explicitly included on 
the enumerated list of instruments treated as a security,293 may be a 
security if they constitute an “investment contract” under the statute.294 
This determination is made on the basis of the Supreme Court’s Howey 
test.295 The Court in Howey provided that the term “investment 
contract” under the Securities Act of 1933 covered a “contract, 
transaction or scheme whereby a person”: (1) “invests his money,” (2) 
“in a common enterprise,” and (3) “is led to expect a profit,” and (4) the 
expected profits are “solely296 from the efforts of the promoter or a third 
party.”297 The fourth prong of the Howey test (regarding expecting 
profits solely from the efforts of others) is likely to be of greatest 
significance in analyzing the Pave transaction’s treatment under 
securities regulations. In assessing whether a joint venture or 
partnership has created a security interest (i.e., whether it constitutes 
an “investment contract”), courts carefully examine the role played by 
different parties in generating the profits and whether that role has 
been vested in a particular individual or group.298 
Thus, the determination of whether a given contract or 
arrangement constitutes a security under the 1933 Act and the 1934 
Act depends on the type of instrument that has been issued (e.g., note, 
stock, partnership interest, or other). Assuming that an interest 
constitutes a security, it will be subject to the antifraud provisions of 
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. However, not all securities issuances are 
subject to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. Although a 
complete analysis of the securities registration rules is beyond the scope 
of this Article, it is instructive to briefly consider one of the categories 
of transactions exempt from 1933 Act registration: “transactions by an 
issuer not involving any public offering.”299 
 293.  15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (detailing the definition of 
“investment contracts”). 
 296.  Subsequent courts have softened the Howey framing of the profit expectation to provide 
that the prong is met if the profits are to be derived “primarily” or “substantially” from the efforts 
of others. See, e.g., United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975) (applying a 
substantiality standard) ; SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(“[T]he word ‘solely’ [in Howey] should not be read as a strict or literal limitation . . . , but rather 
must be construed realistically, so as to include . . . schemes which involve in substance, if not in 
form, securities.”). 
 297.  Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 298.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 419–26 (5th Cir. 1981) (reviewing the 
analysis for determining whether joint venture and partnership arrangements constitute 
“investment contracts” under the 1933 Act). 
 299.  15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012). 
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Over the years, courts and the SEC have developed a set of 
criteria used to determine whether there has been a “public offering.” 
The Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.300 focused on the 
nature of the offerees in evaluating the nature of the offering. 
Specifically, the Court concluded that to secure the exemption: (1) all 
offerees needed access to the type of information that would otherwise 
be included in a 1933 Act registration statement, and (2) the offerees 
must be sufficiently sophisticated to seek and understand available 
information.301 The SEC has added an additional expectation that 
“public advertising is inconsistent with a claim of private offering,”302 
and courts have included other factors to be assessed.303 
In evaluating the Pave transaction under securities law, the 
threshold inquiry would be whether Pave’s arrangement constitutes a 
security under the 1933 Act. Given our determination that Pave may 
look most like a partnership, we would apply the investment 
contract/Howey analysis described above. Recall that the fourth Howey 
prong considers whether profits were expected to be derived by the 
investor solely from the efforts of others.304 Thus, the degree to which 
Pave investors (Backers) exercise managerial control or authority over 
the “enterprise” becomes critical in the securities law treatment of the 
arrangement. The more control exercised over the funding recipient’s 
choices, the less likely that the ISA is a security that requires 
registration.305 Although Pave emphasizes mentoring, real managerial 
control by investors is arguably absent, which increases the likelihood 
that Pave’s arrangement would be subject to regulation as a security. 
Relatedly, assuming the Pave transaction constitutes a security 
subject to the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act (and correspondingly their 
 300.  346 U.S. 119 (1953); see also Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 464–65 (2d Cir. 
1959) (the nature, not number, of offerees determines whether there was a public offering). 
 301.  Ralston, 346 U.S. at 126–27. 
 302.  Non-Public Offering Exemption, Exchange Act Release No. 33-4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 2781 (Nov. 6, 1962), 1962 WL 69540. 
 303.  Among the factors considered by some courts include the number of offerees and the size 
of the offering. E.g., Mark v. FSC Sec. Corp., 870 F.2d 331, 333 (6th Cir. 1989); Cook v. Avien Inc., 
573 F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 899–900 
(5th Cir. 1977) (considering number of purchasers)); Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 
448 F.2d 680, 687 (5th Cir. 1971); Barnett v. Triangle Mining Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
95.439 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1976). 
 304.  See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
 305.  See Hurt, supra note 125, at n.95 (observing that a general partnership interest, in 
contrast to a limited partnership interest, is presumptively not an investment contract). But 
where the facts demonstrate that the general partners lack management knowledge and control, 
even a general partnership interest can be a security. Id. (citing SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 
F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 2007)). See also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422–23 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(general partnership interest is a security if there is no meaningful control). 
 
          
750 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:3:681 
fraud liability provisions), there remains the additional question of 
whether the Pave transaction would be subject to registration 
requirements. Again, a factual inquiry would demand scrutiny of the 
nature of the offerees and the circumstances in which the offering was 
made, using the analysis developed by Ralston Purina Co. and 
subsequent cases. 
Fundamentally, however, what is more significant for purposes 
of the inquiry undertaken in this Article is not the ultimate treatment 
of Pave by the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act but rather the mode of analysis 
for determining their treatment. Depending on how the Pave 
transaction was labeled, it would be subject to a different analysis 
under the securities law. For example, stock would have a strong 
presumption of status as a security;306 a note would be analyzed using 
the family resemblance test;307 and a partnership would be evaluated 
using the Howey test for investment contracts.308 The preliminary step 
of regulation by analogy assigns the ISA a “label,” and that label 
determines which analytical path will apply under the securities laws. 
Beginning the entire process with attention to analogy helps ensure 
that, for example, ISAs that look more similar to debt are subject to a 
securities regulation regime comparable to that accorded to traditional 
loans (such as student loans, consumer loans, or mortgages). 
3. Other Consequences of Partnership Characterization 
Tax and securities law are just two regulatory fields that are 
impacted by a conclusion that Pave looks most like a partnership. 
Partnership characterization would also hold consequences in other 
areas of law. For example, an array of bankruptcy-related issues turn 
on the question of whether Pave is considered a partnership or 
something else (such as debt).309 A finding of partnership may render 
investors liable in tort for acts of the funding recipient.310 It may also 
 306.  See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688 (1985) (“[I]t would 
improperly narrow Congress’ broad definition of ‘security’ to hold that the traditional stock at issue 
here falls outside the Acts’ coverage.”). 
 307.  Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63–64 (1990). 
 308.  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
 309.  For example, if funding providers are creditors, they would have a claim against funding 
recipients in the event of bankruptcy. In contrast, if Pave is a partnership, then each partner might 
be considered liable for certain debts of the partnership owed to other creditors. Additionally, if 
one of the “partners” files for bankruptcy, there may also be consequences for continuity of the 
partnership. 
 310.  Liability can attach both to the partnership and individual partners. The Uniform 
Partnership Act provides: “A partnership is liable for loss or injury caused to a person, or for a 
penalty incurred, as a result of a wrongful act or omission, or other actionable conduct, of a partner 
acting in the ordinary course of business of the partnership or with authority of the partnership.” 
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impact the application of state usury laws, as well as the jurisdiction of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
4. Observations on Regulation 
A few caveats are in order. First, as noted, regulation by analogy 
is likely to be most compelling where the closest analogue is also a 
viable substitute. We believe that this will be the case in most 
situations. For example, individuals looking for funding for a new 
technology business could pursue funding via Pave, or could 
alternatively seek investments from friends, family, or the public. If the 
legal system draws regulatory distinctions between transactions that 
function as close substitutes, this may distort the choice of transactional 
form in a way that might be inefficient.311 However, where the closest 
analogue is not a viable substitute, or where some other funding 
approach is so clearly prevalent as to make the closest analogue 
irrelevant, then other considerations may suggest adoption of a 
different regulatory treatment. 
Second, we make no claim that the most analogous regulatory 
regime will be perfect. Indeed, analogizing to partnerships may subject 
the parties to the complicated rules applicable to partnerships.312 
Complications may also arise if regulatory fields disagree regarding the 
characterization of an arrangement. Our point is that such challenges 
are a feature of our current regulatory reality. For example, smaller 
partnerships, such as the vegetable-stand operators in our earlier 
example, are already subject to complicated partnership rules. Any 
discussion of whether reforms are necessary or whether a safe harbor 
should be enacted should take place as part of a broader conversation. 
Third, as previously noted, we are open to the possibility of 
creating a narrowly crafted safe harbor that provides regulatory 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 305(a) (1997). Similarly, the UPA states: “Except as otherwise provided . . . , all 
partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise 
agreed by the claimant or provided by law.” Id. § 306(a). 
 311.  Again, we do not argue that current regulatory regimes are efficient or optimal. We 
merely contend that additional inefficiency-generating lines should not be drawn without due 
consideration of their location. 
 312.  For example, under United States tax law, a partnership is required to file an annual 
information return reporting its income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits from partnership 
operations. I.R.C. § 6031. However, the partnership itself does not pay income tax. Id. § 701. 
Instead, items of partnership income, gains, losses, deductions, or credits are passed through to 
the partners, who must take separate account of their respective distributive shares of such 
partnership items on their respective tax returns. Id. §§ 702, 704. There are also detailed rules 
governing partner and partnership basis computations, contributions to partnerships, partnership 
distributions, transfers of partnership interests, and other matters. Id. §§ 705, 721–743. 
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certainty in specific situations.313 For example, tax law could mandate 
a particular treatment for certain person-to-person ISAs of a short 
duration that require repayment of a limited percentage of future 
income and that are for certain specified purposes (e.g., education).314 
The existence of such a safe harbor would mean that certainty of tax (or 
other regulatory) treatment could be achieved without resort to analogy 
in those cases falling within the safe harbor. However, such safe 
harbors ought to be narrowly crafted in order to minimize distortions 
and inequities. 
Finally, we do not claim that there will never come a time when 
a new regulatory regime for various ISAs would be advisable. Our 
contention is that because ISAs are new and may develop in uncertain 
directions, a wait-and-see approach that analyzes and classifies them 
by analogy to existing legal categories is preferable to creating a new 
legal category at the outset. Even if and when such a new regime may 
be warranted, however, it is unlikely that such new regime would be 
uniformly appropriate for all ISAs. Any new regulatory category would 
need to be narrowly tailored and carefully considered. 
C. Critiquing the “Investing in Student Success Act of 2014” 
Legislation introduced by Senator Rubio and then-
Representative Petri in the 113th Congress sought to clarify the legal 
treatment of ISAs. The proposed legislation was ultimately not enacted 
but nonetheless is an example of the kind of approach against which 
this Article cautions.315 Instead of recognizing the heterogeneity of 
ISAs, the proposed legislation accords a unified regulatory treatment to 
a wide array of possible arrangements without differentiating between 
them based on their underlying economics. The legislation also does not 
consider how its proposed legal treatment would mesh with current 
legal categories for regulating similar existing transactions, and what 
inequities and distortions might be created by the interaction of these 
regimes. 
1. Legal Status 
The proposed Rubio-Petri Bill authorized individuals to enter 
into “income share agreements,” defined to include agreements entered 
into for “postsecondary education, workforce development, or other 
 313.  See supra note 162.  
 314.  Id. As noted, safe harbors are a design feature of many regulatory fields. See supra notes 
18, 159 and accompanying text. 
 315.  Investing in Student Success Act, H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. pmbl. (2014). 
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purposes.”316 The bill covered agreements meeting the following 
requirements: (1) the first $10,000 of income (as defined under the 
contract) is exempt from the repayment obligation; (2) the maximum 
contract duration does not exceed thirty years (not including extensions 
for years in which the individual’s income is below the $10,000 
exemption amount); (3) the agreement specifies ways in which the 
contractual obligation may be extinguished before the end of the 
payment period; (4) the aggregate amount pledged under all ISAs 
entered into by the individual does not exceed fifteen percent of the 
individual’s future income; and (5) the agreement contains certain 
required disclosures.317 The legislation also contained a noninterference 
provision providing that “[a]n income share agreement shall not be 
construed to give the contract holder any rights over an individual’s 
actions—it simply represents an obligation by the individual [to] pay 
the specific percentage of future income.”318 
The first problem is that the class of transactions authorized is 
potentially both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because it 
might encompass transactions with troubling servitude-like 
characteristics as well as more benign arrangements. Specifically, a 
transaction that authorizes fifteen percent income sharing over thirty 
years (not including extensions) may last almost the entire duration of 
a person’s working life and may encumber a significant portion of 
income during that time. The proposed legislation also allowed the 
parties to define “income” under the contract, without any restrictions 
on breadth.319 Finally, despite the noninterference provision, the bill did 
not account for situations in which funding providers exert soft controls 
over the career and work choices of recipients. As discussed in Part 
IV.B, these are factors that could render an ISA too close to a servitude-
like arrangement to be normatively or legally permissible.320 Yet, the 
legislation did not adequately distinguish acceptable from unacceptable 
transactions. 
On the other hand, the legislation was too narrow because it is 
unclear what it would do to a transaction like Fantex. The proposed 
legislation might not have authorized Fantex because Fantex (1) does 
not have a $10,000 exemption and (2) has a clawback clause should the 
football player quit within two years.321 Yet one could argue that of all 
 316.  Id. § 102(a). 
 317.  Id. § 102(b)–(c). 
 318.  Id. § 102(d). 
 319.  Id. § 102(b)(2). 
 320.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 321.  See Fantex, Inc., supra note 1, at 25. 
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the ISAs, the Fantex athletes are most likely to hold negotiating power 
and that Fantex looks more like insurance for the athlete than a 
problematic equity- or ownership-like arrangement. To the extent that 
the proposed legislation might not have covered Fantex (because it 
failed to recognize its risk-management qualities), it might be 
underinclusive. 
The simultaneous over- and underinclusiveness of the proposed 
bill highlights our concerns regarding overarching legislative solutions 
at the present time. New regulatory regimes that are crafted hastily, 
without assessing the individual economics of each transaction, may 
inadvertently incentivize the wrong kinds of ISAs while suppressing 
more benign variants. This may create distortions in the ISA sector, 
particularly if done without considering how the industry might 
subsequently develop. It is also not clear that simply crafting a 
narrower bill will solve these problems because even a narrower bill 
may be unintentionally over- or underinclusive and distortive. 
2. “Not Debt” Characterization 
A second problem is the bill’s assertion that ISAs are not debt 
and should not be treated like debt. The bill required covered ISAs to 
include the following disclosure: “[T]he agreement is not a debt 
instrument, and . . . the amount the individual will be required to pay 
under the agreement (A) may be more or less than the amount provided 
to the individual; and (B) will vary in proportion to the individual’s 
future income.”322 The bill also provided that ISAs will not be subject to 
state usury laws.323 
The bill’s insistence that ISAs are not debt did not appreciate 
that different ISAs may have different economics and that some present 
and future variants may look enough like contingent debt that they 
should be regulated as such. For example, some ISAs are subject to 
modeling to achieve a specific rate of return (e.g., seven percent in the 
case of Pave).324 If the economics of the transaction as structured make 
it extremely likely that the investor will earn a certain rate of return 
despite the appearance of risk or contingency, it may well make sense 
 322.  H.R. 4436, 113th Cong. § 102(c)(1) (2014). 
 323.  Id. § 104. 
 324.  See, e.g., Richie Bernardo, Usury Laws by State, Interest Rate Caps, the Bible & More, 
CARDHUB, http://www.cardhub.com/edu/usury-laws/#state, archived at http://perma.cc/7KTM-
PQS2 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (listing usury rates by state, including North Dakota’s 5.55 
percent limit, Michigan’s 7 percent limit, Iowa’s 4.75 percent limit, and Pennsylvania’s 6 percent 
limit). 
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for state usury laws to apply, especially since the rate of return on some 
ISAs may exceed the maximum interest rate under state usury laws.325 
Failure to consider the ways in which ISAs may resemble debt 
may enable traditional lenders to use loan-like versions of ISAs to 
circumvent state usury laws and other debt rules. This is symptomatic 
of a more general concern: designing new regulatory regimes without 
examining ISAs on a case-by-case basis or considering how a new 
regime may interact with existing ones to create costs and distortions 
is a risky approach. Given the newness of ISAs, regulation should be 
undertaken on a more nuanced basis. 
3. Taxation 
The proposed bill’s tax treatment of ISAs was somewhat 
inconsistent with its assertion that ISAs are not debt. Under the bill, 
the amount initially received by the funding recipient is not includible 
in the recipient’s gross income.326 This is consistent with the tax 
treatment of traditional borrowing.327 However, the bill did not address 
the situation in which the funding recipient ultimately repays the 
funding provider less than the funds received. In the case of debt, there 
would likely be cancellation of indebtedness income to the funding 
recipient.328 The bill also provided that ISAs are not eligible for the 
student loan interest deduction.329 
With respect to the funding provider, the bill allowed full basis 
recovery before an income inclusion.330 Thus, if a funding provider 
invests $10,000, and receives $2,000 a year for ten years under an ISA, 
she does not have a gross income inclusion until the sixth year. Such 
upfront basis recovery is inconsistent with the tax treatment of 
traditional lenders, who may recover basis in a manner more consistent 
with accrual accounting. Oddly, though, the bill labeled the funding 
provider’s income from the ISA as “interest,” despite the fact that the 
 325.  See State Usury Laws—Maximum Legal Interest Rates, LENDINGKARMA, http:// 
www.lendingkarma.com/content/state-usury-laws-legal-interest-rates/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/7S7J-HUJQ (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (detailing each state’s maximum interest rates).  
 326.  H.R. 4436 § 201(a). 
 327.  See Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) (“Because of the obligation [to repay the 
loan at a future date], the loan proceeds do not qualify as income to the taxpayer.”). 
 328.  See I.R.C. § 108 (2012) (defining limited exceptions to the rule that discharge of debt is 
income in circumstances involving bankruptcy, insolvency, real property, and farms). Thus, if a 
funding recipient ultimately repays only $8,000 over the life of the ISA, should she have to include 
$2,000 in gross income and, if so, when? 
 329.  H.R. 4436 § 301(a); see also I.R.C. § 221(a) (outlining the student loan interest deduction). 
 330.  H.R. 4436 § 201(b)(1). 
 
          
756 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:3:681 
agreement is expressly required to state that the ISA is not debt in 
order to be covered by the bill.331 
This proposed tax treatment is problematic because it creates 
jagged intersections with the tax treatment of similar financial 
instruments (most obviously debt, but others as well) without thinking 
them through. The treatment accorded ISAs is sometimes more 
favorable than that given other transactions (e.g., upfront basis 
recovery) but sometimes less so (e.g., denial of student loan interest 
deduction). These differences may create tax-induced distortions in the 
choice between two economically similar instruments, not to mention 
potential tax inequities. Again, we are not saying that lines should 
never be drawn and special regimes never created. Our point is that 
such lines should be created with caution.332 
4. Bankruptcy Discharge 
The proposed legislation made ISAs nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy, although it was confusing on this point. Specifically, the 
bill would have amended I.R.C. § 221(d)’s definition of “qualified 
education loans” to include “income share agreements.” Therefore, by 
cross-reference, it made covered ISAs nondischargeable, because 
“qualified education loans” are excepted from bankruptcy discharge.333 
The bill also required a disclosure that “the obligations of the individual 
under the agreement are not dischargeable under bankruptcy law.”334 
Such nondischargeability tracks existing bankruptcy treatment of 
education debts but differs from the treatment of many other debts. 
Confusion arises because the bill defined “income share 
agreements” to include agreements “for postsecondary education, 
workforce development, or other purposes.”335 Thus, the bill made all 
ISAs nondischargeable, not just those entered into for education 
funding purposes. This treatment is overinclusive with respect to some 
ISAs and may distort the choice between ISAs and traditional debt.336 
Here, again, appreciating the heterogeneity of possible ISA 
arrangements can help reduce regulatory discontinuities. 
 331.  See id. §§ 102(c)(1), 201(b)(2). 
 332.  See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 16, at 1627–28 (cautioning that distinctions in tax law “be 
based on the efficiency of competing rules rather than on doctrinal concerns or traditional tax 
policy”). 
 333.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B). 
 334.  H.R. 4436 § 102(c)(2). 
 335.  Id. § 102(a) (emphasis added). 
 336.  But to the extent recipients seek ISA funding to pay off nondischargeable student loans 
before seeking a bankruptcy discharge, it might be appropriate to make those ISAs 
nondischargeable as an antiabuse measure. 
 
          
2015] HUMAN EQUITY 757 
5. Investment Company Act Treatment 
The proposed legislation would also have amended the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.337 The Investment Company Act 
(“ ’40 Act”) seeks to protect investors who trust others with the 
management and investment of their savings through a vehicle that 
typically uses the invested funds to hold cash, securities, and/or futures 
and commodities. Mutual funds, for example, are classic investment 
companies. From an investor perspective, the arrangement offers 
investment expertise and diversification. But the arrangement also 
poses the risk of abuse by the managers, particularly given the liquid 
nature of the assets held (as compared to an operating business).338 
Thus, the Investment Company Act requires covered companies to 
register (unregistered investment companies are barred from interstate 
commerce under Section 7 of the Investment Company Act) and 
imposes various restrictions on their operation in order to curb the risk 
of abuse. Among the various restrictions and oversight provisions, 
Section 15 of the Investment Company Act regulates the relationship 
between an investment company and its underwriters and investment 
advisors. Absent such regulation, this relationship could be prone to 
abuse where the “advisor” is also the organizer of the investment 
company. 
The Rubio-Petri Bill sought to exclude from the definition of 
“investment company” persons in the business of arranging ISAs.339 If 
such persons are excluded, the investor protections of the Investment 
Company Act would not apply to investors in ISAs. The bill would have 
achieved this by expanding the current exemption in the Investment 
Company Act from the definition of “investment company.” The 
exemption currently applies to persons engaged in banking, lending, 
and related activities (Section 3(c) of the ’40 Act), and the bill would 
have expanded it to include ISAs. The bill would also have expanded 
the current exemption for persons who do not issue certain securities or 
certificates and are engaged in specified lending type activities by 
including ISAs in those specified activities.340 Thus, the proposed bill 
effectively exempted businesses offering ISAs from regulation under 
the ’40 Act. 
 337.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c). 
 338.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 6 (1940) (“[I]ndividuals who lack integrity will continue 
to be attracted by the opportunities for personal profit available in the control of the liquid assets 
of investment companies . . . .”). 
 339.  H.R. 4436 § 501(1). 
 340.  Id. § 501(2). 
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Like other aspects of the bill, the investment company provisions 
failed to appreciate the variety of possible ISA structures and how their 
legal treatment may interact with that of similar financial 
arrangements. While some ISAs are peer-to-peer, others might, in fact, 
operate similarly to investment companies, as envisioned by the ’40 Act, 
and serve as a centralized repository of cash for passive investment and 
diversification by managers. For example, Lumni enables investors to 
invest in “funds” managed by Lumni, where the fund enters into income 
sharing arrangements with students.341 Lumni offers investors a choice 
of different funds, including for-profit and nonprofit variants.342 It is not 
obvious why such funds should be per se exempt from the “investment 
company” definition, and the investors excluded from Investment 
Company Act protections, just because the funds hold and offer ISAs.343 
This regulatory decision creates inequities based on fund portfolios and 
is likely to generate gaps, distortions, and costs. It might encourage the 
development of a market for investment funds holding ISAs that 
replicate the business of investment companies but escape ’40 Act 
requirements. In contrast, an approach based on regulation by analogy 
would ask whether a given ISA closely mirrors structures traditionally 
covered by the ’40 Act and would recommend consistent treatment 
absent a compelling reason for departure. 
6. Summary Observations 
Failure to consider the particular economics of different ISAs 
and to examine how their regulatory treatment would interact with 
that of similar financial arrangements creates inequities and 
behavioral distortions at the regulatory intersections. Again, we do not 
argue that new regulatory categories should never be created. We 
simply point out that imposition of a new regulatory regime without 
fully understanding the content and development of the regulated 
industry is likely to draw lines in an inefficient and inequitable manner. 
 341.  See About Lumni, supra note 7 (describing “Lumni’s fund management model”).  
 342.  Id.  
 343.  Such funds might qualify for another exemption, such as a (3)(c)(1) or (3)(c)(7) exemption. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2012). The point is that the requirements for such exemptions would 
have to be met independently. There would not be a blanket carve out. Furthermore, even if we 
decided that Lumni’s education focus justified its exclusion from the Act, the actual scope of the 
Rubio-Petri proposal is much broader. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The new ISAs raise a number of important public policy and 
regulatory issues that the legal system is only now beginning to 
contemplate. Given the growth and proliferation of ISAs, however, 
these regulatory issues cannot be ignored. This Article has proposed an 
analytical approach to evaluating ISAs and designing their regulation. 
It has argued that case-by-case regulation by analogy—that is, 
comparing and analogizing each new transaction to existing financial 
arrangements and regulating it akin to its closest analogue—is most 
likely to yield efficient rules that are not over- or underinclusive. 
Regulation by analogy can help avoid the drawing of unfair and 
distortionary lines between economically similar transactions. By 
contrast, a hastily implemented, unified regulatory scheme that 
governs all ISAs runs the risk of being poorly tailored because the new 
agreements are not homogeneous. This Article has suggested a 
multifactor analysis that probes each transaction’s true economics, 
regardless of its formal labels, in performing such regulation by 
analogy. 
One might argue that regulation by analogy creates certain 
risks, including the risk of chilling the ISA market due to lack of 
regulatory certainty. The desire for regulatory certainty or 
predictability is a reasonable goal. However, as we have argued, 
regulatory certainty should not be conflated with substantive 
uniformity. It is possible to achieve a degree of regulatory certainty 
while nevertheless choosing to regulate by analogy. This could be 
accomplished, for example, through the use of advance rulings or 
prototype guidance, or through the judicious use of safe harbors. 
Moreover, substantive uniformity does not necessarily guarantee 
regulatory certainty in application. 
We do not suggest that a unified framework will never be 
possible or desirable. There may well come a time when, given more 
information about these new transactions, it will be possible to craft a 
more unified regulatory approach for at least some ISAs. We argue, 
however, that now is not that time. The market for ISAs is relatively 
new and still developing. Future variants are likely to emerge. Given 
the lack of information and experience regarding these agreements, 
regulation by analogy is the better approach. 
Finally, we in no way imply that current regulatory regimes are 
necessarily perfect or even adequate. Nor do we imply that familiar 
preexisting categories, such as debt, do not raise important public policy 
issues. In fact, there may be serious problems with our current 
regulatory approaches, and income share agreements may serve to 
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illuminate the public policy concerns raised by long-accepted 
arrangements, such as debt. Our point is merely that, to the extent that 
there are deficiencies in current regulatory schemes, this is a problem 
that should be taken up separately. In this sense, our regulation by 
analogy proposal may be characterized as a “second-best proposal” for 
an imperfect world. 
 
